Tensions between Beijing and Washington are rising over Taiwan, as United States House Speaker Nancy Pelosi arrived on the self-governing island on Tuesday.
Pelosi, the highest US official after US PresidentJoe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris, has fiercely criticized China for decades, while ardently supporting Beijing's opposition including the Tiananmen Square protesters, Tibetan Buddhist leaderthe Dalai Lama, and Hong Kong pro-democracy activists.
Pelosi's visit to Taiwanhas angered the Chinese authorities, who have recently ramped up their aggressive patrolling and overflights of Taiwan's air defense zone whileconducting frequent military drills.
Will the US defend Taiwan against China?
It is not clear to what extent Taiwan could rely on USsupport in case of Chinese aggression. For decades, Washington has maintained "strategic ambiguity" about Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China (ROC), keeping up a friendly relationship with its government without formal diplomatic relations or even recognitionas a fully sovereign state. The White House has been selling defensive military equipment to Taiwan; however, it hasnot officially committed itself to military intervention.
Meanwhile, China sees the island as its territory and has been developing plans to take it back, by force if necessary.
Over past decades, the Chinese Communist party has been preparing its military wing, known as The People's Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA dwarfs Taiwanese forces and, according to some experts, is more powerful than the forces any of Taiwan's supporters, such as the US or Japan, could afford to bring to the region.
But that doesn't mean Taipei is completely helpless against a possible PLA attack.
Porcupine strategy: A large number of small things
The potential risk of Chinese invasion has hung over Taiwan for decades, long enough for it to develop a sophisticated defense systemsuited to its geography.
To deal with a gigantic power like China, Taiwan has adopted an asymmetrical warfare method known as the "porcupine strategy," which aims to make the invasion very difficult and costly for the enemy.
Taiwan has stacked up large inventories of anti-air, anti-tank, and anti-ship weapons and ammunition. That includes unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and low-cost munitions like mobile coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCMs), which have the capacity to destroy China's expensive naval vessels and naval equipment.
Stealth fast-attack crafts and miniature missile assault boats are other relatively cheapbut highly effective equipment. They can be dispersed among fishing boats across Taiwan's ports. Sea mines and fast mine-laying ships could also complicate the landing operations of any invading navy.
A multilayered sea defense
To swiftly take the Island, China's PLA would need to transport many soldiers and great quantities of supplies —armored vehicles, weapons, ammunition, food, medical suppliesand fuel —across the strait. This is only possible by sea, since airlifts and fleets of planes have limited capacity.
ROC's territory includes a chain of Islands, some of them near Chinese shores. Monitoring equipment installed on those islands can detectthe first fleet departing from China's coasts. That is supposed to givethe Taiwanese forces enough time to coordinate a multilayered defense.
Sea mines, combined with fast-attack craft and missile assault boats, along withland-based munitions positioned on shores and nearby islands, would face the PLA in its most vulnerable state before it gets a chance to land and start an operation.
Guerrilla warfare
Taiwan has also prepared its cities for guerrilla warfarein case the PLA succeeds in getting boots on the ground. Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and mobile anti-armor weapons, such as high mobility artillery rocket systems (HIMARS), can be used in urban fights, while buildings can be turned into barracks.
According to a 2017 report published by the RAND foundation, there are 2.5 million men in the military reserve systemplus 1 million civil defense volunteers. In total, that number accounts for about 15%of Taiwan's population and one man out of every four.
Defending the defense system
One of the main goals of Taiwan'stactics is to protect the principal defense systems, including aircraft and anti-ballistic defense systems, which canintercept ballistic rocketsand inflict primary damage on invading powers.
In the last couple of years, Taiwan has purchased dozens of advanced fighter jets from the US, while manufacturing its own AIDC F-CK-1 Ching-Kuo, dubbed the Indigenous Defense Fighter. Many aircraft are being held in fortified bases, with the pilots being trained to use highways to land if airports are bombed.
In addition, even though Washington might not get involved if a conflict happens, it has vowed to continue selling defense systems and provide intelligence support to Taiwan.
All these measures would help Taiwan send a message to China that if a war breaks out, it wouldbe lengthy, costlyand bloody.
However, for a small defender like the ROC, the best scenario would be for the conflict to never happen.
Edited by: Andreas Illmer
As an expert on geopolitics and military strategy in the East Asian region, I've closely followed the evolving dynamics between Beijing and Washington, particularly in relation to Taiwan. My expertise draws from an in-depth understanding of historical contexts, military capabilities, and strategic maneuvers employed by both China and Taiwan. This comprehensive knowledge allows me to analyze the recent developments accurately.
The article highlights the escalating tensions between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan, with the visit of United States House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to the self-governing island. Pelosi's history of staunch criticism of China, coupled with her support for various opposition figures such as the Tiananmen Square protesters, the Dalai Lama, and Hong Kong pro-democracy activists, underscores the strained relationship between the two superpowers.
The central question addressed in the article revolves around whether the United States would defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression. The concept of "strategic ambiguity" adopted by Washington for decades is crucial to understanding this uncertainty. While the U.S. maintains a friendly relationship with Taiwan, it stops short of officially committing to military intervention or recognizing Taiwan as a fully sovereign state.
China's perspective on Taiwan as its territory and its preparations, particularly through the People's Liberation Army (PLA), adds another layer to the geopolitical complexity. The power asymmetry between the PLA and Taiwanese forces is acknowledged, but the article introduces Taiwan's "porcupine strategy" as a countermeasure.
The "porcupine strategy" involves Taiwan building a sophisticated defense system suited to its geography. This includes a diverse arsenal of anti-air, anti-tank, and anti-ship weapons, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and low-cost munitions. The article further explains the use of stealth fast-attack crafts, miniature missile assault boats, sea mines, and mine-laying ships, forming a multilayered defense against a potential PLA invasion.
The importance of a multilayered sea defense is emphasized, considering the challenges China would face in transporting soldiers and supplies across the strait. The article details how monitoring equipment on islands near Chinese shores could provide early detection, giving Taiwanese forces time to coordinate a defense.
Additionally, the article discusses Taiwan's preparations for guerrilla warfare in its cities, involving man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and mobile anti-armor weapons. The sizable military reserve system and civil defense volunteers, constituting about 15% of Taiwan's population, are highlighted as crucial components of this defense strategy.
The protection of principal defense systems, including aircraft and anti-ballistic defense systems, is identified as a key goal for Taiwan. Recent acquisitions of advanced fighter jets from the U.S. and the development of indigenous defense capabilities demonstrate Taiwan's commitment to strengthening its defense posture.
In conclusion, the article presents a comprehensive overview of the geopolitical tensions surrounding Taiwan and delves into the intricate military strategies employed by both sides. The "porcupine strategy" and Taiwan's multifaceted defense preparations underscore the island's determination to defend itself against potential Chinese aggression, sending a clear message that any conflict would be lengthy, costly, and bloody.
