Institutional and individual investor preferences for dividends and share repurchases (2024)

Table of Contents
Journal of Economics and Business Abstract Introduction Section snippets Ownership data Univariate and bivariate tests of investor preferences for dividends The preferences of insiders for dividends Conclusion Acknowledgments References (38) Firm size and dividend payouts Journal of Financial Intermediation Taxes, transaction costs and the clientele effect of dividends Journal of Financial Economics Financial flexibility and the choice between dividends and stock repurchases Journal of Financial Economics Disappearing dividends: Changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics Is a dividend tax penalty incorporated into the return on a firm's common stock? Journal of Accounting and Economics The distorting effect of the prudent-man laws on institutional equity investments Journal of Financial Economics Are dividends disappearing? Dividend concentration and the consolidation of earnings Journal of Financial Economics A theory of dividends based on tax clienteles Journal of Finance Patterns of institutional investment, prudence, and the managerial safety-net hypothesis Journal of Risk and Insurance Characteristics of common stock holdings of insurance companies Journal of Risk and Insurance Debt structure, insider ownership, and dividend policy: A test of the substitutability hypothesis in an agency framework Research in Finance Imperfect information, dividend policy, and the ‘Bird in the Hand’ fallacy Bell Journal of Economics Two tiers—But how many decisions? Journal of Portfolio Management Stock ownership in the United States: Characteristics and trends Survey of Current Business Shareholder preferences and dividend policy Journal of Finance Determinants of relative investor demand for common stocks Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences Journal of Political Economy A test of the theory of tax clienteles for dividend policies National Tax Journal Cited by (43) Individual investors’ dividend tax reform and corporate social responsibility Dividend or growth funds: What drives individual investors' choices? How do investors value corporate social responsibility? Market valuation and the firm specific contexts The role of institutional ownership and industry characteristics on the propensity to pay dividend: An insight from company open innovation Feedback trading: Strategies during day and night with global interconnectedness Determinants of the choice between share repurchases and dividend payments Recommended articles (6) What is the relation between financial flexibility and dividend smoothing? The real effects of share repurchases Dividends as a signaling device and the disappearing dividend puzzle Legal Institutions, Ownership Concentration, and Stock Repurchases Around the World: Signal Mimicking? Do institutional investors reinforce or reduce agency problems? Earnings management and the post-IPO performance Is price support a motive for increasing share repurchases? FAQs

Journal of Economics and Business

Volume 59, Issue 5,

September–October 2007

, Pages 406-429

Author links open overlay panel

Abstract

This study shows that individual investors prefer to invest in high dividend yield stocks and in dividend-paying firms whereas relatively lower-taxed institutional investors tend to prefer low dividend yield stocks and non-paying firms. Consistent with Brennan and Thakor's [Brennan, M. J., & A. V. Thakor. (1990). Shareholder preferences and dividend policy. Journal of Finance, 45, 993–1018] adverse selection model, informationally superior institutional investors are shown to prefer firms that engage in larger share repurchases whereas individual investors do not prefer share repurchases. These results are contrary to the widely held beliefs (a) regarding tax-based and non-tax-based dividend clienteles, (b) that firms pay dividends to encourage monitoring by institutional investors, and (c) that the personal tax rate on equity is low (or zero).

Introduction

Many prior studies assume or predict that (high) dividend-paying firms attract institutional investors because institutions generally face lower tax rates than individuals (see, e.g., Allen, Bernardo, & Welch, 2000; Redding, 1997; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).1 Traditionally, therefore, researchers have largely accepted the assumption that high dividend yields attract institutional investors without question, and without empirical examination. In this study, I examine this assumption directly.

In addition, many institutions are widely believed to face a variety of non-tax incentives to invest in dividend-paying stocks. Under both common law and the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), institutional managers, in their fiduciary capacity, are expected to behave in the manner of a prudent person. Indeed, some institutions stopped holding stocks that omitted dividends in the post-ERISA period and purchased stocks that reinitiated dividends (see Brav & Heaton, 1998). Also, some institutional investors have restrictions in their charter prohibiting them from investing in non-paying stocks. Finally, a preference for dividends could also exist for some fiduciaries and non-profit organizations which are required to spend only “income” and not “principal” (see Feldstein & Green, 1983). All of these non-tax factors may induce institutions to invest in dividend-paying stocks. So I also examine if tax and non-tax factors lead institutions (individuals) to have higher (lower) holdings in dividend-paying firms.

Relative to lower-taxed institutional investors, individual investors have traditionally had a tax incentive for share repurchases as opposed to taxable dividends. However, Brennan and Thakor (1990) contends that the non-proportional aspect of repurchases renders less well-informed individual investors vulnerable to expropriation by better informed institutional investors, so relative to individuals, institutions should prefer to invest in firms that engage in share repurchases. I also test these contradictory hypotheses related to institutional and individual investor preferences for share repurchases.

It is generally assumed that larger cash payouts help to reduce agency costs (see, e.g., Easterbrook, 1984, Jensen, 1986), and asymmetric information (see, e.g., Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller & Rock, 1985). Also, it is commonly believed that institutional investors have better information gathering abilities and are also better monitors (see Allen et al., 2000). If institutional investors are better informed than individual investors, and/or if institutional investors are better able to limit agency costs through their monitoring capabilities, then individual investors may have a stronger preference for cash payouts (both dividends and share repurchases).

Using data for the 1989–1996 period, I find that institutional investors have a preference for low dividend yield stocks relative to high dividend yield stocks whereas non-institutional and non-insider, “individual” investors have a preference for high dividend yield stocks relative to low dividend yield stocks. I also find that individuals prefer dividend-paying firms whereas institutions prefer non-dividend-paying firms. Consistent with Brennan and Thakor (1990), the results show that institutional investors prefer firms that engage in larger share repurchases whereas individual investors do not prefer share repurchases. Taken together, these results are inconsistent with (a) the predictions of the tax-based dividend clientele hypothesis and (b) the hypothesized preference of institutions for dividend-paying firms for non-tax reasons.

Previous research on investor preferences for cash payouts and on the identity of the marginal investor in (high) dividend-paying stocks has followed widely different approaches and provides conflicting results. Elton and Gruber (1970) finds that the ex-dividend day tax effect per dollar of dividends is lower for high dividend stocks than for low dividend stocks, which is consistent with the expected clientele effect because high-dividend stocks should attract low-tax investors. Subsequently, several studies have used non-tax explanations for abnormal ex-dividend day returns, while others have shown evidence consistent with a tax-based explanation. In a review of the evidence related to the ex-day phenomenon, Graham (2003) concludes that it is “not possible to unambiguously interpret the ex-day evidence in terms of personal taxes.” Dhaliwal, Erickson, and Trezevant (1999) finds that dividend initiators typically experience an increase in both the number of institutional shareholders and the percentage of shares held by institutions, and Brav and Heaton (1998) finds that dividend omitting firms usually experience a reduction in the number of institutional shareholders.2

Blume, Crockett, and Friend (1974) and Pettit (1977) find some evidence consistent with tax-based dividend clienteles by relating the tax bracket of individual investors and the dividend yield of the stocks held by them. Lewellen, Stanley, Lease, and Schlarbaum (1978) uses the same data set as in Pettit (1977) but adopts a slightly different approach. Instead of analyzing investor portfolios as in prior work, it analyses individual securities to detect whether or not the stockholders in a particular firm display any significant concentration by personal tax circ*mstances. The results provide only weak support for the tax related dividend clientele hypothesis. Strickland (1997) provides evidence that relative to taxable institutions, tax-exempt institutions do have a slight preference for comparatively higher dividend yields. Finally, Graham and Kumar (2006) examines the actual stock holdings and trades of the clients of a discount brokerage house and finds mixed evidence in support of the tax-based dividend clientele hypothesis.

A few studies have examined the relation between aggregate institutional ownership or some subset thereof (such as insurance companies) and various firm characteristics, including dividend yield (see, e.g., Badrinath, Gay, & Kale, 1989; Badrinath, Kale, & Ryan, 1996; Del Guercio, 1996; Gompers & Metrick, 2001). These studies find either no relation between institutional holdings and dividend yield or a significant negative relation. However, none of these papers focus specifically on the relation between institutional ownership and dividend yield. More importantly, all of these papers ignore any tax-based motivations or implications and include the dividend yield variable as an independent variable in regressions of aggregate institutional ownership simply to test for “prudent” behavior or the “safety-net” hypothesis. Thus, the intent of these papers is very different from that of this paper, which focuses on the tax implications.

Unlike prior studies that examine differences in yield preferences either among individual investors who face different marginal tax rates or among institutional investors who face different tax rates, this study examines differences in the preferences of higher taxed individual investors and lower-taxed institutional investors for dividends and share repurchases, and, more generally, for dividend-paying firms. As such, this approach allows us to test the widely believed but largely unproven claims that firms which pay (high) dividends tend to attract greater institutional investment and that higher taxed individual investors are not the marginal investors in (high) dividend-paying stocks. Using aggregate institutional and individual ownership data also allows for a better test of the differences in the preferences of the two groups of investors due to (a) non-tax fiduciary considerations, (b) the hypothesized monitoring role of institutions, and (c) adverse selection reasons as suggested in Brennan and Thakor (1990). These issues cannot be addressed adequately by examining the preferences of a subset of investors as is done in most prior studies.

In addition, relative to previous work, this study makes several original contributions. In addition to analyzing the relation between aggregate institutional ownership and dividend yield using a sample of all firms, I also conduct a similar analysis for the sample of only dividend-paying firms. By using such an approach, I can test with greater precision whether or not institutions prefer high-dividend firms to low dividend firms because I am able to eliminate the confounding effects of various non-tax incentives (such as fiduciary considerations or charter restrictions) that may induce institutions to invest in dividend-paying firms. Another contribution of this study is that it analyses not only institutional preferences for high dividend yields but also for dividend-paying firms relative to non-paying firms. This allows for a test of the implications of the tax as well as the non-tax incentives, both of which suggest that institutions should have larger holdings in dividend-paying firms. Finally, this is the first comprehensive empirical examination of both institutional and individual investor preferences for share repurchases.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I describe the data used in this study. In Section 3, I present the results of the main empirical tests that examine the preferences of institutional and individual investors for (high) dividend-paying firms and share repurchases. In Section 4, I discuss some additional empirical results and check for the robustness of the findings. Section 5 concludes.

Section snippets

Ownership data

SEC regulations require all institutional investors (such as mutual funds, life insurance companies, banks, trusts, government funds, corporate pension funds, union funds, endowment and foundation funds, investment managers, etc.) with investment discretion over portfolios exceeding $100 million in equity securities to report their holdings in 13(f) filings at the end of each quarter. Institutions may choose to omit their holdings of a firm's securities from a 13(f) filing if they hold fewer

Univariate and bivariate tests of investor preferences for dividends

In this subsection, I examine the average dividend yields for groups of firms formed on the basis of their institutional and individual holdings. First, I use a sample of only dividend-paying firms. This approach is used to focus more on tax related effects, and to reduce noise due to potential non-tax factors such as fiduciary reasons or charter restrictions that may lead institutional investors to invest in dividend-paying firms.

All dividend-paying firms are first grouped into three

The preferences of insiders for dividends

In additional tests I examine the preferences of insiders for dividends (the detailed results are not reported here). I find that the insider ownership of a firm is negatively related to its dividend yield. Also, insider ownership is higher in non-paying firms relative to dividend-paying firms. These results are consistent with the finding of Perez-Gonzalez (2000) that tax preferences of large individual shareholders explain a considerable part of the decline in dividend payouts for firms since

Conclusion

After controlling for other factors, this study shows that relatively lower-taxed institutional investors prefer low dividend yield stocks to high dividend yield stocks whereas higher-taxed individual investors are found to prefer high dividend yield stocks to low dividend yield stocks. Additionally, individual investors prefer dividend-paying firms whereas institutional investors typically prefer non-paying firms. Finally, an examination of investor preferences for share repurchases reveals

Acknowledgments

I am extremely grateful to the members of my dissertation committee – Michael Brennan, Bhagwan Chowdhry (the chair), John Riley, and Richard Roll – and to Harry DeAngelo for many helpful comments and suggestions, and for their encouragement and support. I am also grateful to David Reeb (the editor), an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at the University of New Mexico, the University of Southern California, and Temple University for their comments; and Sehyun Yoo for excellent research

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      This paper examines the effect of individual investors’ dividend tax on the fulfillment of corporate social responsibility (CSR). By introducing the implementation of dividend tax reform (DTR) for individual investors, we present strong evidence that the reduction of the individual investors' dividend tax significantly reduces the fulfillment of CSR activities related to all stakeholders, except for shareholders. A plausible mechanism is that the reform encourages individual investors to increase holding periods, thereby crowding out institutional investors, which further reduces the firms’ external monitoring pressure. The effect is particularly pronounced for firms with high ownership concentration, low individual investor attention, and low executive ownership. By revealing the unintended effect of the individual investors’ DTR on the firms’ fulfillment of CSR, our study presents a clear policy to regulators concerned with CSR and investor protection.

    • Dividend or growth funds: What drives individual investors' choices?

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      We study dividend fund buying behavior using over 80,000 individual Chinese mutual fund investors from a private Chinese mutual fund account dataset. Based on a variety of specifications and logistic regressions, we empirically investigate investors' characteristics in choosing dividend-paying and/or growth mutual funds under different market scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, this research represents an initial attempt to study individual dividend investors in mutual fund markets. We find that older Chinese investors prefer dividend-paying funds less than growth funds, but this depends on different market conditions, and the age effect shows a nonlinear mode when considering age grouping. Moreover, investors' prior experience plays a crucial role in choosing the fund type; however, the conclusions vary with market scenarios. In addition, female investors prefer more dividend-paying funds than do male investors, but investing experience counteracts this difference. We also find that geographic location is a contributor when investors decide the fund type.

    • How do investors value corporate social responsibility? Market valuation and the firm specific contexts

      2021, Journal of Business Research

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      A firm’s earnings stability represents its ability to consistently generate positive earnings. Firms with high earnings stability exhibit positive financial outcomes over time (Badrinath, Gay, & Kale, 1989; Jain, 2007; Muller, Fielitz, & Greene, 1984), providing a reliable source of financial slack. Since achieving high CSR performance often requires a long-term commitment of resources (Sprinkle & Maines, 2010), demonstrating stable earnings is likely to affect investors’ perception regarding whether resources spent on CSR are justified.

      In this paper, we offer a new explanation regarding the specific contexts when CSR will have a positive impact on a firm’s market value. We argue that investors will value CSR positively if the firm-specific context implies that CSR is expected to create a market premium through the mechanisms of downside risk reduction or upside efficiency enhancement. Specifically, firms that have high financial risk or environmental risk are able to benefit from CSR as a risk mitigation strategy, and firms that have high earnings stability are able to benefit from CSR as an efficiency enhancement strategy. Using panel data for U.S. firms from 2002 to 2011, we show that CSR is beneficial to firm value when a firm faces high financial and/or environmental risk or has high earnings stability, whereas when a firm operates in a low-risk environment or has low earning stability, CSR is detrimental to firm value.

    • The role of institutional ownership and industry characteristics on the propensity to pay dividend: An insight from company open innovation

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      The purpose of this study is to test the free cash flow agency theory hypothesis; namely, (a) whether differences in industrial sector affect a company’s propensity to pay dividends, and (b) whether institutional ownership is able to substitute for the propensity to pay dividends as a bonding mechanism. The analysis uses logistic regression to explore the existence of institutional ownership as a substitute for paying cash dividends in companies belonging to different industrial sectors. The results show that companies in the manufacturing sector have a greater propensity to pay dividends compared to those in non-manufacturing sectors. The results also indicate that low institutional ownership, as an external monitoring mechanism, can substitute for increasing the propensity to pay dividends. Overall, the results are consistent with implications in dividend policy. The results support the notion that the propensity to pay dividends accommodates different behavioral factors, considering sectoral differences. In addition, the results illustrate the relevance of alternative theories in explaining dividend policy from the perspective of agency theory. The results show that sectoral comparisons, in addition to institutional ownership factors, play important roles in the propensity of Indonesian companies to pay dividends. This study shows that each industry sector has different income characteristics, which affect the differences in propensity to pay dividends.

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      Along with Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1995), institutional investors have a trading advantage and mainly trade at the open or during periods of unusual demand. Thereby, this group of investors typically prefers nonpaying dividend firms in contrast to individual investors as stated by Jain (2007).33 For day returns, the highest values are 5.9% and 6% for Germany with respect to f1 and f2.

      Feedback trading strategies have gained much popularity among researchers in the last decades and are used to illustrate how new information based on returns is reflected in the markets. This paper extends previous studies by decomposing the overall return premium and introducing the global feedback trading model. The global feedback trading model assumes an interconnectedness between multiple countries and captures spillovers. Empirical results illustrate two important findings. First, feedback trading strategies differ across markets when distinguishing between day and night returns. Second, evidence for changing feedback trading is provided by examining the interaction of specific markets.

    • Determinants of the choice between share repurchases and dividend payments

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      Increased share repurchase activity has raised renewed concerns as to whether the positive share price effect generally associated with share repurchase announcements is motivating companies to repurchase shares rather than to invest in future growth. This study focused on ascertaining the significant determinants of the choice between share repurchases and dividend payments to establish whether short-term share price manipulation affects the payout choice in South Africa. The significant determinants for the overall sample were shareholder heterogeneity, the size of the distribution and the level of company undervaluation. The significance of these variables were confirmed when disaggregating the data into sector and size categories. Additionally to this, the agency cost and history of dividend payment determinants were identified as significant determinants in the disaggregated analyses. Short-term share price manipulation was not found to be the driver of the payout choice.

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    This paper is based on Chapter 1 of my Ph.D. dissertation at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), which was titled, “Institutional Investors do not Prefer Dividends: Individual Investors do.”

    View full text

    Copyright © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    Institutional and individual investor preferences for dividends and share repurchases (2024)

    FAQs

    Do institutional investors prefer dividends or share repurchases? ›

    Shareholder preferences and dividend policy. Journal of Finance, 45, 993–1018] adverse selection model, informationally superior institutional investors are shown to prefer firms that engage in larger share repurchases whereas individual investors do not prefer share repurchases.

    Should I buy stock that doesn't pay dividends? ›

    Stocks without dividends can be excellent investments if they have low P/E ratios, strong earnings growth, or sell for below book value.

    Why would firms choose cash dividends over share repurchase? ›

    Dividends return cash to all shareholders while a share buyback returns cash to self-selected shareholders only. So when a company pays a dividend, everyone receives cash according to the proportion of their shareholding whether they need cash or not.

    What is the difference between a dividend and a share repurchase policy? ›

    A share buyback or a dividend can trigger various corporate actions, such as adjustments to the share capital, the number of shares, and the share price. A buyback reduces the share capital and the number of shares, while a dividend may result in a stock split or a bonus issue to maintain the share price.

    Should you collect dividends or reinvest? ›

    If your goal is long-term portfolio growth, dividend reinvestment makes sense: Reinvested dividends help grow your investment. If you aim to generate an income stream or fund an immediate financial need, you're better off taking cash dividends.

    What are the benefits of share repurchase? ›

    Share buybacks are a more efficient way to return capital to shareholders because the shareholder doesn't incur any additional tax on the buyback. Taxes are only triggered once the shareholder sells the shares.

    Why should you avoid dividends in stocks? ›

    Dividends generate taxable income

    Depending on the underlying stock and how long you've held it, you might be taxed federally at long-term capital gains rates (anywhere from 0% to 20%) or at ordinary income rates (between 10% and 37%). You also have no control as to when a dividend is paid, or if it's paid at all.

    What should I avoid with dividend stocks? ›

    Investors should avoid dividend-paying companies that are saddled with excessive debt. Companies with debt are forced to channel their funds into paying it off rather than committing that capital to their dividend payment programs. For this reason, investors should examine a company's debt-to-equity ratio.

    Why do people invest in stocks that don't pay dividend? ›

    Companies that don't pay dividends on stocks are typically reinvesting the money that might otherwise go to dividend payments into the expansion and overall growth of the company. This means that, over time, their share prices are likely to appreciate in value.

    Is a share buy back good or bad? ›

    Who Benefits From a Stock Buyback? Companies benefit from a stock buyback because it can preserve stock prices, consolidate ownership, and take the place of dividends. Investors can benefit because they receive their capital back; however, a repurchase doesn't always benefit investors.

    What are the disadvantages of share repurchase? ›

    Despite the positive effects for building stockholder wealth, long-term use of stock buybacks can produce negative effects on the balance sheet and important financial ratios. Two potential downsides include tipping into negative stockholders' equity and distorting the ROE leading up to and following the tipping point.

    Why do some investors prefer high dividend paying stocks while other investors prefer stocks that pay low or nonexistent dividends? ›

    The dividend yield measures how much income has been received relative to the share price; a higher yield is more attractive, while a lower yield can make a stock seem less competitive relative to its industry.

    How are cash dividends and share repurchase affect shareholders wealth? ›

    A share repurchase is equivalent to the payment of a cash dividend of equal amount in its effect on total shareholders' wealth, all other things being equal. If the buyback market price per share is greater (less) than the book value per share, then the book value per share will decrease (increase).

    Do share buybacks benefit shareholders? ›

    Share buybacks can create value for investors in a few ways: Repurchases return cash to shareholders who want to exit the investment. With a buyback, the company can increase earnings per share, all else equal. The same earnings pie cut into fewer slices is worth a greater share of the earnings.

    What are the effects of dividend payment or share repurchase in a perfect market? ›

    In perfect capital markets, an open market share repurchase has no effect on the stock price, and the stock price is the same as the cum-dividend price if a dividend were paid instead. In perfect capital markets, investors are indifferent between the firm distributing funds via dividends or share repurchases.

    What type of investors prefer dividends? ›

    Different investor types tend to have a preference for how excess cash flow is returned. For example, investors who desire supplemental income, such as retirees, often prefer to receive dividends. A dividend is a real cash payment, which the investor can then use to spend however they wish.

    Why do institutional investors favor high dividend payouts? ›

    Institutional investors favour dividend-paying stocks for a number of reasons. Many institutions rely on a steady stream of dividend income to meet their ongoing liabilities (for instance, pension funds and insurance companies). Overreliance on capital gains can lead to income shortages in down markets.

    Why do institutions favor high dividend payouts? ›

    Institutional Investors

    Like individual investors, institutions might want a high dividend payout because of low taxes. Corporations, for example, have a taxable exclusion of a certain percentage of the dividends received from other companies.

    What kind of investors like dividends? ›

    Because of their lower volatility, dividend stocks often appeal to investors looking for lower-risk investments, especially those in or nearing retirement. But dividend stocks can still be risky if you don't know what to avoid.

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