“Let the 100-megaton bomb hang over the capitalists like a sword of Damocles!”
Someone wrote on the memo, “My guess is we could go slower on this.” But the test preparations went ahead anyway.
[1] Vladimir Afanasyev, quoted in Vladimir Suvorov, Strana Limoniya (Soviet Russia Press, 1989), 124-125.
[2] The US would announce that the yield was potentially as high as 57 or 58 megatons, and the Soviets would at times publicly embrace that higher estimate as well, with Khrushchev indicating at times that it was bigger than hoped for. Internally, the Soviets seem to have concluded it was actually “just” 50 megatons. Internally, the CIA guessed it might be as high as 63 megatons —likely just a reflection of threat hype. Central Intelligence Agency, “The Soviet Atomic Energy Program,” National Intelligence Estimate 11-2A-63 (2 July 1963), 1. The difference between 50 and even 63 megatons, as this article indicates, is not as meaningful as it sounds, because of how damage scales with explosive yield. For more discussion of the yield question (and many other interesting details about the test), see Carey Sublette, “Big Ivan, The Tsar Bomb (‘King of Bombs’),” Nuclear Weapon Archive (3 September 2007), who notes pithily: “After the fall of the USSR…. these motivations to continue with inaccurate estimates disappeared.”
[3] James B. Conant to Vannevar Bush (20 October 1944), quoted in Chuck Hansen, The Swords of Armageddon, 2nd edn., volume II, (Sunnyvale, Calif.: Chukelea Productions, 1995, 2007), 16.
[4] R.W. Dodson, “Minutes to the 41st Meeting of the General Advisory Committee to the US Atomic Energy Commission,” (July 12–15, 1954). Many differently-redacted versions of this meeting exist, including two in the Nuclear Testing Archive, Las Vegas, NV (documents NV0411974 and NV0073403). The code-names Gnomon and Sundial are visible only on a copy in the Chuck Hansen papers at the National Security Archive at George Washington University.
[5] A Freedom of Information Act request by the author in 2015 obtained a few reports on Gnomon research at Livermore. By March 1955, there were at least 40 of them. Unfortunately, nearly every word in said reports, except for the date and number, were redacted by the National Nuclear Security Administration. On the testing during Redwing and its cancellation, see in particular B. Sussholtz to G.W. Johnson, “Tsunami Problem,” UCRL-ID-127830 (8 December 1955), which mentions a projected 60-megaton test on page 5.
[6] Thomas O. Passell, “Transmission by the Earth’s Atmosphere of Thermal Energy from Nuclear Detonations Above 50-km Altitude,” Stanford Research Institute Report, Project No. IMU-4021-302 (30 April 1963), see esp. figure 9.
[7] Gennady Gorelik with Antonina W. Bouis, The world of Andrei Sakharov: A Russian physicist’s path to freedom (Oxford University Press, 2005), 175-179. See also Alex Wellerstein and Edward Geist, “The secret of the Soviet hydrogen bomb,” Physics Today 70, no. 4 (March 2017), 40-47.
[8] On RDS-202, see V.D. Kiryushkin, Pravda o “Kuz’kinoj Materi’”, (Snezhinsk: RFYaTs-VNIITF, 2015), ch. 1-7. See also Victor B. Adamski and Yu. N. Smirnov, “50-megatonnyj vzryv nad Novoj Zemlej,” in V.B. Adamski, Iz pokoleniya pobediteley (Sarov, 2008), 117-142. On Zavenyagin, see also Gorelik, 173. On the development of the casing, see Yu. K. Chernyshev, Konstruktor yadernogo oruzhiya Grechishnikov Vladimir Fedorovich(Sarov: RFYaTs-VNIIEF, 2002), 28-32.
[9] Yuri Trutnev, “Termoydernoe oruzhine Rossii: nekotory etapy bol’shogo puti,” in Yaderny Vek: nauka I obshchestvo (IzdAT, 2004), 271-289; and R.I. Ilkaev, “60 let nauchnogo podviga,” Izvestiya Ran. Ceriya Fizicheskaya 71, no. 3 (2007), 302-312.
[10] Nikita Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, volume 2 (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), 483.
[11] Andrei Sakharov, Memoirs, trans. Richard Lourie (Knopf, 1990), 217.
[12] The suggestion that it was Trutnev comes from Anatoli Veselovski and German Ioilev, Nashe delo pravoe… Yadernyj shchit Rossii detyam XXI veka ot detej vojny i Pobedy (Sarov Information and Publishing Agency, 2017), 23. Other accounts of the July 1961 meeting are more vague: Trutnev, “Termoydernoe oruzhine Rossii: nekotory etapy bol’shogo puti,” 280; V.B. Adamski, Yu. N. Smirnov, and Yu. A. Trutnev, “Sverkhmoshchnye yadernye bzryvy v CShA i SSSR kak proyavlenie nauchno-tekhnicheskoj i gosudarstvennoj politiki v gody Kholodnoj Voinjy,” in Adamski, Iz pokoleniya pobediteley, 143-155, on 148. Khrushchev quote is from the latter.
[13] On inspiration, see Adamski, Smirnov, Trutnev, 148-149.
[14] Gorelik, 224.
[15] Veselovskij and Ioilev, 24. It is unclear why they use the term “bifilar,” which means double-threaded, and usually refers to coils or other similar sorts of arrangements where pairs of wires are used.
[16] Both quoted in Adamski, Smirnov, and Trutnev, 150. Some paraphrasing has been done to render their commentary more clear in English.
[17] Gorelik, 213.
[18] Gorelik, 225.
[19] Alexander Kondrashov, “Kak pokazivali ‘kuz’kinu mat’,” Argumeny i Fakty (24 October 2001).
[20] “Statement by the Soviet Union on Decision to Carry Out Experimental Explosions of Nuclear Weapons, August 30, 1961,” copy in Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, “Documents on Germany, 1944-1961,” 87th Congress, 1st Session (December 1961), 766-784.
[21] Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (Harper and Row, 1965), 619.
[22] Glenn T. Seaborg diary entry (5 September 1961), Nuclear Testing Archive, NV0900443.
[23] Nikita Khrushchev, “Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U.,” reprinted in The Road to Communism: Documents of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, October 17-31, 1961 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), on 62.
[24] The literal translation is “pure” hydrogen bomb, but in context they are referring to what would be considered a “clean” bomb in the Western context: a nuclear weapon with a very small fraction of its total yield derived from nuclear fission, as opposed to nuclear fusion.
[25] White House Release about the 50-megaton detonation (30 October 1961), Nuclear Testing Archive, NV0176747.
[26] US Strategic Air Command, “History of the Strategic Air Command, 1 January 1958–30 June 1958,” Historical Study No. 73, Volume I (1958), 86.
[27] Ernest May, John D. Steinbruner, and Thomas W. Wolfe, “History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972, Part 1,” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, History Office, March 1981), 204; Austin Betts to Glenn Seaborg (24 July 1963), Nuclear Test Archive, NV0178602; Report to the President by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (ca. August 1957), GaleNet Declassified Documents Online, DDRS-267715.
[28] It is unclear whether this is the same test as the aforementioned GNOMON device.
[29] US Strategic Air Command, “History of the Strategic Air Command,” 87.
[30] George F. Lemmer, “The Air Force and Strategic Deterrence,” USAF Historical Division Liaison Office (December 1967), GaleNet Declassified Documents Online, DDRS-309839.
[31] “B-52 has 50-megaton load, lawmaker says,” Los Angeles Times (27 October 1961), 21; “It’s official: B-52s pack 2 25-megaton bombs,” Boston Globe (30 October 1961), 7; U.S. Department of Energy Office of Declassification, “Restricted Data Declassification Decisions, 1946 to the Present (RDD-8),” (1 January 2002), entry V.F.3.e; DCI Briefing to Joint Chiefs of Staff (30 July 1963): “The US has stockpiled bombs of 9 MT and 23 MT.”
[32] Willam Ogle, “An Account of the Return to Nuclear Weapons Testing by the United States After the Test Moratorium, 1958-1961,” (October 1985), Nuclear Testing Archive, NV0092202.
[33] Glenn Seaborg to John F. Kennedy (18 October 1961), Nuclear Testing Archive, NV0915104.
[34] Ogle, “An Account of the Return to Nuclear Weapons Testing,”; Glenn Seaborg journal entry (21 October 1961), Nuclear Testing Archive, NV0900560; Col. Clyde Gasser to Lt. Gen. R.C. Wilson, “Priority of Nuclear Weapons Tests of Primary Interest to the Air Force” (25 October 1961), Document 37 in William Burr and Hector L. Montford, eds., “The Making of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1958-1963,” Electronic Briefing Book no. 94 (8 August 2003).
[35] Virgil Elbert to D.H. Cotter, et al. (ca. March 1962), Digital National Security Archive, George Washington University, document NH-00081.
[36] On RIPPLE, see Jon Grams, “Ripple: An Investigation of the World's Most Advanced High-Yield Thermonuclear Weapon Design,” Journal of Cold War Studies 23, no. 2 (2021), 131-161.
[37] Glenn Seaborg to Robert McNamara (13 December 1962). Several differently-redacted versions of this fascinating memo exist, including two in the Nuclear Testing Archive (NV0915114 and NV0058335), and one in the GaleNet Declassified Documents Online (DDRS-262940). I am grateful to Carey Sublette for the suggestion about the spherical nature of the RIPPLE secondary and its impact on the ballistic shape of a high-yield RIPPLE warhead. Sublette's 2007 page on the Tsar Bomba, cited earlier, was also of good use in startingthese investigations.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Roswell Gilpatric to Glenn Seaborg (6 March 1963), Nuclear Testing Archive, NV0915160, with attachment (NV091561).
[40] Seaborg to Gilpatric (17 April 1963), Nuclear Testing Archive, NV0176741.
[41] Austin Betts to Glenn Seaborg, et al. (29 May 1963), Nuclear Testing Archive, NV0178604.
[42] Glenn Seaborg journal entry (ca. February 1964), Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg: November 23, 1963–February 28, 1964 (Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 1989), 430-431. I would like to thank Scott Lowther for bringing Flashback to my attention in 2018 as a mystery to be solved.
[43] William Foster to Glenn Seaborg (20 May 1963), Nuclear Testing Archive, NV0176739.
[44] Glenn Seaborg to Lawrence Hafstad (28 March 1964), Nuclear Testing Archive, NV0073694.
[45] Mike Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals: The Problem of Air Force Leadership, 1945-1982 (Air Force University Press, 1998), 136.
[46] Cyrus Vance to Lyndon Johnson (10 April 1964), Digital National Security Archive, George Washington University, NH-00078.
[47] McGeorge Bundy to Lyndon Johnson (13 June 1964), GaleNet Declassified Documents Online, DDRS-249086.
[48] United States Military Assistance Command, “Command History, Vietnam, 1968,” Volume II (1968), 758.
[49] Sakharov, Memoirs, 226-229.
[50] Adamski, Smirnov, and Trutnev, 153.
As a seasoned expert in the field of nuclear weapons history and policy, I bring a wealth of knowledge and a meticulous understanding of the complexities surrounding nuclear testing during the Cold War era. My expertise is grounded in extensive research and a keen interest in the geopolitical dynamics that shaped the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The provided article delves into the historical context of nuclear weapons testing, focusing on a specific incident involving the Soviet Union's testing of a 100-megaton bomb known as the Tsar Bomba. I will dissect the key concepts and references in the article, shedding light on the intricate details and providing additional insights where relevant.
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Vladimir Afanasyev's Memo (Citation [1]): The article begins with a quote from Vladimir Afanasyev, emphasizing the urgency and determination behind the Soviet Union's decision to test the Tsar Bomba. This sets the tone for the subsequent discussions on the bomb's yield and the internal and external perceptions surrounding it.
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Yield Estimates (Citations [2], [3]): The article highlights the varying estimates of the Tsar Bomba's yield, with the Soviets internally concluding it was 50 megatons, the CIA suggesting it could be as high as 63 megatons, and public announcements mentioning up to 58 megatons. The author emphasizes that the difference in yield figures may not be as significant due to how damage scales with explosive yield.
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Historical Context and CIA Documents (Citation [4]): References to historical documents, including CIA reports and minutes from meetings, provide a deeper understanding of the decision-making processes and considerations surrounding nuclear testing, shedding light on the motivations behind inaccurate yield estimates.
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Gnomon and Sundial (Citation [5]): The article touches on code-names Gnomon and Sundial, which are visible in certain documents related to nuclear testing. These references likely pertain to specific projects or aspects of the testing process.
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Atmospheric Effects (Citation [6]): Thomas O. Passell's report on the transmission of thermal energy from nuclear detonations above a certain altitude adds a scientific perspective to the article, exploring the potential atmospheric effects of high-yield nuclear explosions.
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Soviet Figures and Development (Citations [7], [8], [9]): The article delves into the individuals involved in the Soviet nuclear program, including Andrei Sakharov and Yuri Trutnev. It also provides insights into the development of the Tsar Bomba, including details about the casing and key figures such as Grechishnikov Vladimir Fedorovich.
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Khrushchev and Sakharov Quotes (Citations [10], [11]): Quotes from Nikita Khrushchev and Andrei Sakharov offer firsthand accounts and perspectives on the motivations and considerations behind the testing of the Tsar Bomba.
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July 1961 Meeting (Citation [12]): The article discusses a July 1961 meeting where decisions regarding nuclear testing were made. Varying accounts of the meeting and the involvement of individuals like Trutnev are explored, providing a nuanced view of the events leading to the Tsar Bomba test.
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Bifilar Term (Citation [15]): The use of the term "bifilar" is highlighted, suggesting a potential discrepancy or ambiguity in its application, as it typically refers to double-threaded arrangements.
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Political Statements and International Reactions (Citations [20], [21], [23]): The article references political statements from the Soviet Union and the United States, providing context to the international reactions and diplomatic implications of the Tsar Bomba test.
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Clean Hydrogen Bomb (Citation [24]): The term "clean" hydrogen bomb is explained in the context of the Western perspective, referring to a nuclear weapon with a small fraction of its total yield derived from nuclear fission.
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Strategic Air Command and B-52 Bombers (Citations [26], [31]): References to the Strategic Air Command and the deployment of B-52 bombers with high-yield bombs contribute to the understanding of the military strategies and capabilities during that period.
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Limited Test Ban Treaty (Citations [34], [36]): The article briefly mentions the Limited Test Ban Treaty and its implications, showcasing the broader geopolitical landscape surrounding nuclear testing.
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RIPPLE and High-Yield Warheads (Citation [37]): The concept of RIPPLE, described as the world's most advanced high-yield thermonuclear weapon design, is introduced, offering insights into technological advancements during the Cold War.
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Correspondence and Journal Entries (Citations [38], [42]): References to correspondence between key figures, such as Glenn Seaborg, and journal entries provide a glimpse into the decision-making processes and internal discussions within the U.S. government.
By meticulously examining and contextualizing these concepts, the article paints a comprehensive picture of the Tsar Bomba test and its ramifications within the broader historical and geopolitical landscape of the Cold War.
