MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS: Speedy Trial: SixthAmendment Right to a Speedy Trial
2021 (October Term)
United States v. Guyton, 82 M.J. 146 (in accordance with the Sixth Amendment, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial; although pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable, the right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment).
(an appellate court weighs the following four factors to determine if there is a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the accused’s demand for a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the accused).
(the prejudice factor used to determine if there is a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation should be assessed in the light of the three interests of the accused which the speedy trial right was designed to protect: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2)minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired; of these forms of prejudice, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system; with regard to the second interest, this interest anticipates that an appellant will demonstrate some degree of particularized anxiety and concern greater than the normal anxiety and concern associated with the delay of his trial).
(in this case, the military judge did not err when he ruled that appellant could not prevail on his Sixth Amendment claim because he demonstrated no prejudice and the other three speedy trial factors only weighed slightly in his favor; appellant did not claim that his defense was impaired or that he was incarcerated or restricted pending trial, but rather focused on the interest he had in minimizing his anxiety and concern, stating that he experienced stress flowing from the pending charges; however, he only waited about 9 months for his trial to begin and the record showed no particularized anxiety in the record).
2020 (October Term)
United States v. Harrington, 81 M.J. 184 (in military prosecutions, the accused’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial protections are generally triggered when charges are preferred).
2015 (September Term)
United States v. Wilder, 75 M.J. 135 (an analysis under the Sixth Amendment focuses on the date of either preferral or the imposition of restraint or confinement, and analyzes an alleged violation based on the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514, 530 (1972)).
(trial stops the speedy trial clock for the Sixth Amendment).
2013 (September Term)
United States v. Danylo, 73 M.J. 183 (in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial).
(in the military, Sixth Amendment speedy trial protections are triggered upon preferral of charges or the imposition of pretrial restraint).
(in determining whether an appellant has been denied his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment, an appellate court considers the following factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) whether the appellant made a demand for a speedy trial; and (4)prejudice to the appellant).
(unless the delay is facially unreasonable, the full due process Sixth Amendment speedy trial analysis will not be triggered).
(a delay of 116 days to bring appellant to trial after he entered pretrial confinement was not unreasonable for Sixth Amendment speedy trial purposes, where the delay was primarily due to the prosecution’s strategy of turning all four of the other alleged members of a drug ring into witnesses against appellant; such a delay in obtaining immunity for the witnesses was certainly not unusual or inappropriate and did not take an inordinate amount of time; furthermore, the government took that time to investigate the case, convene a pretrial confinement review hearing, prepare and obtain approval for the charges, and hold an Article 32 hearing).
(an unexplained delay of 170 days by the CCA to resolve the government’s Article 62, UCMJ, appeal of the military judge’s dismissal of charges against appellant while he remained in confinement was not unreasonable for Sixth Amendment speedy trial purposes, where, even though both parties had sought to expedite the processing of the appeal, fewer than six months elapsed between the government’s notice of appeal and the CCA’s decision and the Article 62 appellate process continued deliberately, though slowly).
(under the Sixth Amendment speedy trial test, there are three similar interests relevant to the prejudice analysis: (1) prevention of oppressive incarceration pending appeal; (2) minimization of anxiety and concern of those convicted awaiting the outcome of their appeals; and (3)limitation of the possibility that a convicted person’s grounds for appeal, and his or her defenses in case of reversal and retrial, might be impaired; of these forms of prejudice, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system).
(a delay of 350 days to bring appellant to trial after he entered pretrial confinement did not prejudice appellant in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial; although appellant served two months of confinement beyond his adjudged sentence, and claimed that his confinement conditions caused him particularized anxiety and concern, he was credited with the pretrial confinement he served against his adjudged sentence, the confinement conditions were not unique to his case, some of his anxiety could be attributed to his own misconduct while in pretrial confinement, and there was no indication of any loss of evidence or impact to case preparation due to the delay).
(analysis of a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim requires consideration of the entire period of delay from arrest (pretrial confinement) or preferral of charges until commencement of trial on the merits; that review spans a continuum of process from review by the convening authority under Article 60 to review by a CCA under Article 66 to review, in appropriate cases, by the CAAF under Article 67).
(military judge did not err in focusing on the delay caused by the government’s Article 62, UCMJ, appeal, rather than the total period of pretrial delay, in determining whether appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated, where the CCA, by whose judgment the military judge was bound, had already ruled on the first portion and decided that there was no speedy trial issue in the pre-appeal delay).
2012 (September Term)
United States v. Wilson, 72 M.J. 347 (delays attributable to an accused do not weigh in favor of a Sixth Amendment violation).
(an accused’s assertion of his speedy trial right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether he was deprived of the right).
2009 (September Term)
(because Article 10 imposes amore stringentspeedy trial standard than the Sixth Amendment set forth by the SupremeCourtin Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514 (1972), Sixth Amendment speedytrialstandards cannot dictate whether there has been an Article 10violation).
2007
United States v. Tippit, 65 M.J. 69 (the SixthAmendment to the Constitution provides that the accused in a criminalprosecution shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial;a four-part test has been established for assessing whether a delayamounts to a Sixth Amendment constitutional violation, requiring abalancing of the length of the delay, reasons for the delay, whetherthe accused demanded a speedy trial, and any prejudice to the accusedfrom the delay; in addition to the Sixth Amendment, timely processingalso is subject to assessment under the Due Process Clause of the FifthAmendment).
(an unconditional plea of guilty which results in a finding of guiltywaives any speedy trial issue as to that offense under the SixthAmendment; in this case, appellant’s unconditional guilty pleas waivedhis speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment).
2005
UnitedStates v. Mizgala, 61 M.J. 122 (the Sixth Amendment to the UnitedStatesConstitution contains the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial;althoughthe text of the amendment does not address waiver, courts have heldthat theSixth Amendment right is waived by a voluntary guilty plea; this Courthasconsistently noted that Article 10 creates a more exacting speedy trialdemandthan does the Sixth Amendment; not only is the demand for a speedytrial underthe UCMJ more exacting, by virtue of Article 98, UCMJ, unreasonabledelay indisposing of criminal charges in the military is unlawful; while thefull scopeof this more exacting Article 10 right has not been precisely definedby thisCourt, it cannot be more exacting and at the same time be consistentwith SixthAmendment protections).
2000
UnitedStates v. Becker, 53 MJ 229 (test for violationsof theSixth Amendment right to a speedy trial includes four factors:(1) lengthof delay; (2) reasons for the delay; (3) appellant’s demand for speedytrial;and (4) prejudice to appellant).
(appellant suffered no Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation whereit tookgovernment 337 days to accomplish sentence rehearing where thegovernmentotherwise proceeded with reasonable diligence, appellant made no demandforspeedy and prompt hearing, and there was no evidence of prejudice).
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The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial is a cornerstone of the American justice system, ensuring timely proceedings and protecting the accused from prolonged uncertainties and injustices. In legal contexts, courts employ a four-factor test, established in Barker v. Wingo (1972), to assess if this right has been violated: (1) the length of the delay, (2) reasons for the delay, (3) the accused's demand for a speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the accused.
Cases like United States v. Guyton (2021) emphasize the importance of evaluating prejudice in light of three key interests: preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing the accused's anxiety, and limiting potential impairment to the defense. Prejudice, especially regarding the impairment of the defense, is considered the most serious factor.
In military prosecutions, triggers for Sixth Amendment protections include the preferral of charges or the imposition of pretrial restraint, as illustrated in United States v. Harrington (2020) and United States v. Danylo (2013).
Factors like delays due to prosecution strategies, appeals, or investigative processes are considered within reason, as long as they don't lead to facially unreasonable delays. For instance, United States v. Wilder (2015) focuses on the date of preferral or imposition of restraint to assess alleged violations.
Appellate courts weigh the entire period of delay, encompassing various stages of the legal process from review by the convening authority to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), as seen in cases like United States v. Wilson (2012) and United States v. Tippit (2007).
Moreover, the more stringent Article 10 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) often demands immediate steps to inform the accused of charges and ensures a faster trial process compared to the Sixth Amendment. Article 10 sets a more exacting standard, as discussed in United States v. Thompson (2009) and United States v. Mizgala (2005).
Notably, an accused's delays or unconditional guilty pleas can impact their Sixth Amendment rights. Cases like United States v. Wilson (2012) and United States v. Tippit (2007) highlight how delays attributable to the accused may not weigh in favor of a violation, and unconditional guilty pleas can waive the right to a speedy trial.
Throughout these cases, the core principles of the Sixth Amendment's right to a speedy trial remain consistent, emphasizing the balance between timely proceedings and safeguarding the accused's rights.
Each case outlined contributes to the evolving interpretation and application of the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial right within the legal framework, illustrating the complexities and considerations involved in determining whether a violation has occurred.
