Power in sovereign debt markets: debtors’ coordination for more competitive outcomes (2024)

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Martin Guzman

Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, Universidad Nacional de La Plata (FCE-UNLP), CONICET, and Suramericana Visión

. e-mail: mg3463@columbia.edu

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Maia Colodenco

Suramericana Visión

. e-mail: Capital Federal Buenos Aires C1053ABD

Argentina

maicolo@gmail.com

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Anahí Wiedenbrug

Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) and Suramericana Visión

. e-mail: awiedenbrug@flacso.org.ar

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Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 33, Issue 2, April 2024, Pages 507–518, https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtae008

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29 January 2024

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    Martin Guzman, Maia Colodenco, Anahí Wiedenbrug, Power in sovereign debt markets: debtors’ coordination for more competitive outcomes, Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 33, Issue 2, April 2024, Pages 507–518, https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtae008

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Abstract

Evidence suggests that sovereign debt markets are not featured by perfect competition but power dynamics are a key determinant of market outcomes such as ex-post returns on sovereign bonds. In such environment, coordination within each side of the market matters. With the purpose of influencing the international debt architecture, private creditors have historically been fairly coordinated and their interests more aligned ex-ante. Sovereign debtors, however, have not. The power asymmetry that that entails has equity and efficiency implications, both ex-ante and ex-post. This paper analyzes asymmetries in collective action of each side of the sovereign debt market and the mechanisms through which it affects market outcomes. It also analyses the Cartagena Group’s experience in the 1980s as a prominent historical case of greater borrower coordination and identifies mechanisms through which greater debtor coordination could be fostered.

© The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press in association with Oxford University Press and the Industrial and Corporate Change Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com

This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/pages/standard-publication-reuse-rights)

JEL

F02 - International Economic Order and Integration F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions F55 - International Institutional Arrangements H63 - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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