Opinion | Has Biden altered the one-China policy? Yes and no. (2024)

The one-China policy, in place since 1972, stipulates that the United States recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the “sole legal government of China” — yet it also allows Washington to support Taiwan’s right to self-determination and self-defense, with the question of whether the United States would intervene on Taiwan’s behalf left unanswered (which is known as “strategic ambiguity”). This position has underpinned U.S.-China relations for decades and helped maintain a tense peace across the Taiwan Strait. According to Biden’s own National Security Strategy, released this week, the administration remains “committed to our one China policy” and opposes attempts by either side to change the status quo.

That’s hard to square with Biden’s public commitments to send U.S. troops to defend Taiwan, which represent at least a rhetorical change in the U.S. approach. Is the contradiction intentional? According to multiple officials I spoke with, the answer depends on whose intentions we are talking about.

For Biden, the move away from “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity” was entirely intentional; for his staff, not so much. There was no formal policy process underlying the change in rhetoric. But presidents have the power and prerogative to make changes in foreign policy on their own. Biden, who faces political pressure from his own party and from Republicans to avoid being outflanked on the China-Taiwan issue, made the call.

At the same time, there’s no administration effort to reexamine the underlying Taiwan strategy, despite Biden’s new position. As a result, the contradiction is now ingrained in U.S. policy with no real explanation. It’s a paradox. Like Schrödinger’s Cat, “strategic ambiguity” is both alive and dead at once. And nobody wants to be the one who opens the box to find out for sure.

But for many China and Taiwan watchers, Biden’s move away from “strategic ambiguity” does not necessarily mean the end of the larger one-China policy. After all, they argue, the rest of the framework still exists, and there’s little upside to getting rid of it.

“You can achieve greater strategic clarity without undoing the one-China policy,” said Randall Schriver, a former Pentagon and State Department Asia official. “It is intact in the sense of the diplomatic position. But it is of diminished meaning and significance.”

Like Schriver, some officials argue that the contradiction is not as consequential as it seems. Beijing always assumed that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense militarily, they say; Biden just said the quiet part out loud. Officials also note that the increased support Washington has offered Taiwan pales in comparison with the increased military, diplomatic and economic threats coming from Beijing.

“It’s a diplomatic arrangement that entailed reciprocal agreements, and it has been fraying and diminished because the Chinese haven’t been meeting their commitments to take a fundamentally peaceful approach,” Schriver said.

There are fair arguments both for and against moving away from “strategic ambiguity.” Will explicit U.S. commitments to defend Taiwan make Chinese President Xi Jinping think twice before attacking, raising deterrence and preventing a war? Or will such moves convince Xi his hand is being forced (or at least give him a pretext for that claim), thus making war more likely? Honestly, there’s no way to know.

As Xi heads into his third term, he is ramping up his aggressive foreign policy as he tightens his hold on the reins of power. He is clearly threatening an attack when he says that “reunification” is an objective that “must be fulfilled.” Beijing pretends the United States has agreed to its so-called one-China principle, which asserts that Taiwan is part of China, unlike our one-China policy, which acknowledges but does not endorse Beijing’s claim to the island.

China is trying to have it both ways, accusing the United States of being the instigator while denying China’s role in destabilizing the situation. But it is still unclear whether Xi will be patient and accept this shaky status quo or accelerate his plans for reunification by force. Either way, the United States must join with partners to help Taiwan bolster its defenses, thus giving Taiwan a credible chance of defending itself. We must hope for the best and prepare for the worst.

The one-China policy is only a symbol of the long-standing, tacit agreement between the two countries to leave the Taiwan question unresolved. It’s a policy worth saving, if possible. But it’s not an agreement the United States can uphold alone. Right now, the one-China policy looks fragile, but it’s Xi — not Biden — who will decide whether the policy and the peace it preserves will survive.