Food Supply (2024)

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Subject essay: Lewis Siegelbaum

At the outset of the First World War, Russia’s officials judged its capacity to sustain the war effort in favorable terms, largely because of the country’s abundance of grain-growing regions. They could not have been more wrong in terms of their calculations. Within a year, shortages of articles of primary necessity — kerosene, footwear, textiles, and food — were registered in cities and towns throughout the empire. The foremost cause of these shortages was the diversion of resources, production and transport to war needs, which left inadequate supplies for the civilian economy. The creation of a Special Council for Food in 1915, the imposition of rationing, and other measures did little to alleviate the problem. Food riots, in which working-class women and soldiers’ wives figured prominently, were a frequent occurrence. The February Revolution was initiated in Petrograd by women workers’ protests over bread shortages. Food supply would continue to be a source of popular discontent throughout 1917 and beyond.

The Provisional Government, having inherited the problem of food shortages, moved quickly to set up a State Committee on Food Supply (March 9) and establish a state grain monopoly with fixed prices (March 25). The monopoly was overseen by a hierarchy of provincial and district supply committees which, dominated by state officials, merchants, and landowners, attempted to impose requisition levels on the grain-producing peasantry. The entire process hinged on the assumptions that the currency in which peasants would be paid would remain stable, and that consumer goods would be available for purchase at equivalent prices. Neither of these assumptions was realized, and the result was frequent clashes between goods supply agents and peasants in the grain-surplus provinces and the exacerbation of food shortages in the cities. By late summer, Petrograd had only two days’ worth of bread reserves, a situation that jammed railroads, river ports, and roads with a new urban type, the “bagmen” – individuals acting on their own or as agents of various organizations who skirted restrictions on private sales of goods by traveling to surplus areas and carrying what they had purchased back to the towns and the grain-poor northern provinces.

By October, normally a month of food abundance, supplies had dwindled further, prices continued to rise rapidly, and lengthy food lines had become ubiquitous in the cities. The situation in Petrograd, far removed from the main food producing areas, was particularly grim. Only one-tenth of the prewar milk supply was reaching the city whose population had swollen owing to the influx of refugees and soldiers. Many desperate citizens resorted to shoplifting and ransacking of storehouses while others, outraged at being deprived of goods, set upon with fury those who were caught stealing or merely suspected of it. The problem of food supply thus delegitimized the Provisional Government, much as it had the tsarist government. The Soviet government continued many of the same food supply policies (e.g., rationing, state monopoly, requisitioning), albeit with a different ideological justification and greater ruthlessness, during the succeeding years of civil war.

Food Supply (1)
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The article delves into the intricate complexities of Russia's food shortages during the First World War and the subsequent impact on its economy and society. My expertise in history, particularly in the socio-economic aspects of wartime conditions, allows me to unravel the nuances in this narrative.

The Russian officials' initial estimation of their capacity to sustain the war effort based on abundant grain-growing regions reflects their reliance on agrarian resources. However, their miscalculation became evident within a year as shortages of essential goods like kerosene, footwear, textiles, and food emerged across cities and towns. The diversion of resources, production, and transport to fulfill wartime needs severely strained the civilian economy, a classic repercussion of wartime economies worldwide.

The establishment of the Special Council for Food in 1915 and the implementation of rationing were attempts to mitigate the crisis but proved ineffective. Food riots erupted, primarily involving working-class women and soldiers' wives, culminating in the February Revolution, triggered by bread shortages in Petrograd.

Upon inheriting the issue, the Provisional Government swiftly formed the State Committee on Food Supply and instituted a state grain monopoly. However, the execution was marred by flawed assumptions: stable currency for peasant payment and the availability of consumer goods at equitable prices. These misjudgments led to clashes between supply agents and peasants, exacerbating shortages.

By late summer and into October, food scarcity intensified, leading to soaring prices and widespread food lines in cities. Petrograd, distant from major food-producing areas, faced severe shortages, with only a fraction of its prewar milk supply reaching the swelling population. This dire situation led to societal breakdowns, including shoplifting, ransacking, and conflicts among citizens.

The failure to address the food supply crisis delegitimized both the Provisional Government and, later, the Soviet government, which continued similar policies during the civil war, albeit with different ideological justifications and increased severity.

In summary, this period in Russian history illustrates how miscalculated estimations, flawed policies, and mismanagement of resources during wartime created catastrophic socio-economic repercussions, influencing political upheavals and societal discontent.

The concepts covered in this article span socio-economic dynamics during wartime, the impact of resource diversion on civilian economies, the failure of governmental interventions in managing shortages, the influence of food scarcity on social unrest and political legitimacy, and the continuum of policies from the Provisional to the Soviet government during the Russian Civil War.

Food Supply (2024)

FAQs

Is there enough food supply? ›

There is no global food shortage because we produce more than enough food to feed everyone in the world. We produce so much food globally yet one–third of it – 1.3 billion tons – is wasted.

Will there be enough food in the year 2050 explain your answer? ›

The United Nations Environment Programme estimates that the global population will reach 10 billion by 2050. Also by that same year, the UN projects that a scarcity of water, land and energy will lead to a global food shortage.

How can we produce enough food? ›

Grow a wider variety of crops. Around 60 per cent of all calories consumed come from just four crops: rice, wheat corn and soy. Ensuring food access and availability in the face of climate change will require the production of a wider range of foods. Focus on child nutrition.

What is the best way to solve food shortage? ›

  1. Strategies to overcome food shortages. 1.Technological. Storage. • One way to address food shortage is to improve the storage and transportation of food. ...
  2. Agricultural. Multiple cropping and crop rotation. · Multiple cropping is a practice of growing two or more crops on a single piece of land at the same time.

Is there a food supply problem? ›

A: There are currently no nationwide shortages of food, although in some cases the inventory of certain foods at your grocery store might be temporarily low before stores can restock.

How bad is the food shortage? ›

The global food crisis is affecting millions of people around the world. In 2023, record levels of acute food insecurity persist due to protracted food crises and new shocks. In 48 countries, 238 million people are facing high levels of acute food insecurity – 10% more than in 2022.

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