Findings | China's Belt and Road: Implications for the United States (2024)

Despite potential gains for the United States, BRI poses significant risks to U.S. economic interests.

BRI’s size and scope give it the potential to boost global gross domestic product (GDP) by as much as $7.1 trillion by 2040 and reduce global trade costs by up to 2.2 percent.30 It promises to provide much-needed financing to developing countries, helping build the infrastructure necessary to erase blackouts, ease transportation bottlenecks, and make many economies more globally competitive. The United States, even if not formally part of BRI, would likely benefit in some ways if BRI builds infrastructure that accelerates global economic growth.

Were U.S. companies able to sell equipment and material required in the production, maintenance, or operation of the infrastructure built in BRI countries, those U.S. firms would stand to profit. To the extent that modern infrastructure lowers transportation and communications costs in BRI countries, U.S. producers trading with and operating out of those countries would also benefit. Global political stability usually accompanies sustained economic growth, and the United States would benefit from greater stability throughout the developing world.

The actual implementation of BRI, however, makes it likely that the costs will considerably outweigh the benefits for the United States. BRI has added to some participating countries’ debt levels to an unsustainable extent. BRI projects are tied to Chinese contractors and conducted through a largely closed bidding process, excluding firms from the United States and many other countries. Because Chinese workers do most of the construction and then operate the newly built facilities, the transfer of know-how and training of local workers is limited.31

China’s push to set technical standards through BRI and its banks’ ability to provide subsidies to firms building BRI projects will likely tilt the playing field in some countries away from non-Chinese multinational corporations, as well as local firms. In many BRI countries, the United States will struggle to keep pace with China as Chinese firms rapidly gain market share and Chinese technical standards become the norm.

When these emerging debt crises in BRI countries materialize, they will undermine global economic growth and macroeconomic stability at a time when the COVID-19 pandemic has already led to the sharpest global economic contraction since the Great Depression. Debt crises also have the potential to increase the risk of a financial crisis.32 Countries that go through a debt crisis will likely endure a long-lasting economic contraction, which would lower demand for U.S. exports.33 A debt crisis that occurs amid a pandemic would be even more catastrophic, as the country would likely be forced to cut back on social services in order to meet debt obligations, which could hamper efforts to contain COVID-19 and deal with its aftermath. Finally, debt distress that results in countries leasing back major projects or collateralizing a high percentage of their loans means more countries could become economically dependent on China, which China could leverage to extract political concessions in ways that undermine U.S. interests.

BRI creates unfair advantages for Chinese companies, leaving U.S. and other foreign companies unable to compete in a number of BRI countries.

Although Beijing consistently emphasizes that BRI projects are open to all bidders and that it would welcome partnerships with foreign companies on projects, Chinese companies still win the vast majority of BRI contracts. An examination of the contractors participating in Chinese-funded projects shows that 89 percent are Chinese companies, 7.6 percent are local companies (companies headquartered in the same country where the project was taking place), and 3.4 percent are foreign companies. Projects funded by MDBs, however, favor local contractors (40.8 percent), with a rough split between Chinese (29 percent) and other foreign companies (30.2 percent).34 China has used BRI to help propel its construction contractors into global leaders, holding the top five and seven out of the top ten spots in the ranking of global contractors in the world. No U.S. firms are even in the top twenty today.35

China has successfully used its development model to create industrial champions. The process often starts with a state-supported Chinese company importing technology (either legally or through coercion or sometimes theft) from foreign firms. These Chinese firms then adapt that technology while significantly increasing their output, production processes, and experience, selling into a domestic Chinese market often protected in some ways by tariffs or other regulatory barriers from import competition. The large Chinese domestic market allows these firms to grow into huge companies, often building sophisticated and well-honed production processes, which they then use in export markets, including in BRI countries. Aided by state-backed financing on favorable terms to the companies, these firms are then well positioned to win construction contracts and many other deals in export markets, particularly in developing countries. A significant portion of the Chinese goods sold represent excess production that is looking for a home, so Chinese companies often sell at prices far below what market-based companies can offer.

China’s push to export high-speed and standard-gauge rail along BRI provides an example of this development model in action. After energy, BRI’s most ambitious, expensive, and closest-to-completion undertaking is to build railroad lines transporting goods and people from China across Central Asia to Russia and Europe, along with additional lines running from southwestern China throughout Southeast Asia and railroads in Africa and Latin America. To develop its railroad system from one in which trains moved at an average speed of nineteen miles per hour in 1993 to one in which, just fifteen years later, sleek trains moved at nearly 220 miles per hour, China began by leveraging its vast domestic market to import foreign technology and adapting the technology at home.36 Beijing has built more miles of high-speed rail domestically than the rest of the world combined.

As China became saturated with high-speed rail lines, it sought to export its excess capacity and identified BRI as the perfect conduit. As with other sectors, railroad construction allows Beijing to export excess capacity, particularly steel, and to secure more reliable sources for needed inputs. China is providing subsidies to BRI countries to facilitate the purchase of Chinese rail, which is displacing rail built by multinationals from other countries, in particular Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea.37 Although it is unclear whether the economics justify the cost of constructing these rail lines through Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and other regions, they will help reorient economies toward China.

China is growing its financial technology companies, which use BRI to gain privileged access to millions of consumers while potentially giving Beijing major surveillance opportunities.

The World Bank estimated in 2017 that nearly two billion adults lack access to a bank account or mobile money provider.38 Such unbanked individuals rely on cash, which can be unsafe and hard to manage, and find it difficult to navigate financial emergencies without access to more sophisticated financial services.

The COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating the trend of slowed lending and increasing debt distress.

Prior to the pandemic, China’s BRI lending had already shown signs of slowing, a result of slackening demand, efforts by Beijing to raise lending standards, and attempts by Chinese banks to deleverage.56 Even before the pandemic, the probability that BRI countries would be unable to repay their loans was increasing, with the World Bank estimating nearly one-third of BRI countries to be at high risk of debt distress because of underlying macroeconomic weaknesses.57 By the end of 2019, an estimated $20 billion of BRI projects had been delayed, with another $64 billion put on hold, and $12.6 billion canceled.58 BRI also had run into a series of problems as countries such as Malaysia and Myanmar renegotiated BRI projects to lighten their debt burdens, convinced they were unsustainable and structured to primarily benefit China.59 Other capital-intensive BRI projects in Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Thailand were scaled back, canceled, or stalled.60

The economic fallout of COVID-19 has accelerated these trends. BRI lending continues to slow—China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced one-fifth of BRI projects had been “seriously affected” by COVID-19—and is likely to remain at a more moderate pace.61 Even if China wanted to continue to fund BRI at its pre–COVID-19 pace, it could not, as lockdown restrictions impede Chinese firms’ abilities to send workers and materials to construction sites abroad.62 Demand for Chinese loans has fallenbecause BRI countries cannot be sure they can generate the economic growth necessary to pay them off. With less margin for error in the face of a global economic recession, BRI has likely entered a new phase of smaller, more rigorous lending to projects that have greater chances of success. BRI’s smaller scale means that the benefits and risks of BRI are likely to be reduced moving forward.

COVID-19–induced crises are exposing the debt sustainability problems brought on by BRI.

Debt struggles in many BRI countries predate the initiative, and BRI is one of many factors contributing to countries’ debt distress. At the same time, BRI has exacerbated debt distress, and China’s approach to lending and debt restructurings often compounds these issues.

China’s BRI lending differs from development finance provided by traditional lenders, and the global economic contraction brought on by COVID-19 has exposed the shortcomings of China’s lending approach:

BRI is predominantly financed by debt, with most projects backed by two state-run policy banks, the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (China EXIM), and some state-owned commercial banks.63 CDB, the world’s largest provider of development finance, has committed $250 billion to fund BRI projects.64
China’s central bank provides massive capital injections to China’s policy banks, which also enjoy low borrowing costs. These advantages allow China’s policy banks to subsidize operations linked to BRI and be less demanding than other multinational banks in their lending criteria.65
In contrast to loans from traditional providers of development finance, China’s loans are generally not concessional, and CDB and China EXIM expect to make a return on their investments.66 The loans also lack policy conditionality; they contain few or no expectations of host country economic or political reforms.67

For many BRI countries, especially authoritarian regimes, this is an attractive package, especially compared with other lenders, who insist on reforms tied to loans.

Although not setting explicit debt traps, China’s lending practices contribute to debt crises along BRI.

China has often been accused of using BRI to set “debt traps”—intentional Chinese efforts to load countries with unsustainable debt that will allow Beijing to seize assets or induce political concessions when debts go unpaid—but there has yet to be a case in which China has taken control of other countries’ infrastructure.70The notion is largely based on one case—the $1.1 billion Hambantota Port project on Sri Lanka’s southern coast. Sri Lanka’s president, motivated by a desire to develop his home district, initiated this project with China, and most of Beijing’s involvement in the port predated BRI. The ninety-nine-year leasing of the port to a Chinese SOE in 2017 was the result of numerous idiosyncratic factors, including Sri Lanka’s preexisting crippling debt (largely to commercial creditors), balance-of-payments problems, a natural disaster, civil war, and the government’s decision to privatize state assets, allowing China to bid on the port.71

Although BRI countries often do encounter trouble financing projects and seek to renegotiate loan terms, renegotiations often cut in favor of the host country, with Chinese companies accepting losses, calling into question whether a debt-trap strategy would even benefit China.72 In addition, China incurs reputational costs when BRI projects fail. Hambantota is now invoked to demonstrate the perils that come with accepting Chinese financing. The notion of debt traps also robs BRI countries of agency: host governments determine the nature of BRI projects in their countries and have to approve projects and take on the related loans. BRI countries pursue projects that they believe are in their interests; China cannot simply foist unwanted projects on countries.73 Yet, although actual asset seizure may not be the norm, therisk is clear that countries unable to repay their debts to China could become clients of China, deferring to it on political or strategic issues.

Nonetheless, economic stress brought on by COVID-19 could make some BRI projects unsustainable and lead to accusations of debt-trap lending, regardless of China’s intentions. The initiative suffers from a self-selection processwhereby many countries opt for BRI projects because they have poor macroeconomic fundamentals and nowhere else to turn for financing. The COVID-19 pandemic has derailed many BRI countries’ already shaky economies, quickening the reckoning with BRI-related debt. Given the long time horizon necessary for large infrastructure projects to generate the growth necessary to pay for themselves, COVID-19 increased debt distress at a time when most BRI projects are not producing any revenue for the host countries. Debt renegotiations have now multiplied, with more on the horizon (see figure 3).

Better deployment of international financial institution (IFI) resources, along with debt relief, is required to meet the needs of vulnerable countries during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that the COVID-19 pandemic caused the world economy to contract by 3.5 percent in 2020—the most severe global economic cataclysm since the Great Depression.74 The poorest countries have been among the hardest hit, as they lack policy tools to cushion the blow and have experienced capital flight and remittance loss.75 In February 2020, the IMF found that more than half of the world’s low-income countries were in, or at high risk of, debt distress.76 As of June 2020, a major credit rating agency had downgraded to negative its outlook on at least fifteen BRI countries.77 Foreign exchange pressures have also led to a near doubling in debt servicing costs.78 The pandemic has raised the specter of a significant emerging market debt crisis.

Major lenders have tried to respond. In March 2020, the IMF made an open-ended pledge to deploy as much of its $1 trillion of lending capacity as needed to shore up member economies.79 So far, the IMF has provided over $100 billion in financial assistance to 85of its 189 members and has extended over $280 billion in total lending commitments.80 In addition, MDBs have approved $57 billion of support for needy countries.81 Nearly all of these funds have gone to developing countries. BRI countries—Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, the Maldives, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the Philippines, among others—are among the leading recipients of this international assistance.

Still,a sizable gap remains between the needs of BRI countries and the amount of assistance currently being offered by theIFIsand MDBs. The IMF estimates that emerging markets need at least $2.5 trillion in financing to weather COVID-19–related economic shocks, far greater than what has been pledged.82 New financing from the IFIs cannot meet all of these needs. BRI countries, including Djibouti, Laos, Maldives, Pakistan, and Zambia, among others, have flooded Beijing with requests for renegotiations of loan terms and debt forgiveness.83 Kyrgyzstan announced that it had worked out a settlement with China EXIM, its largest single creditor, to reschedule $1.7 billion of debt repayments.84CDB has extended its credit line to Sri Lanka by $700 million, lowered the interest rate on loans, and delayed repayment, and Sri Lanka has requested a new $500 million loan from Beijing.85 Nonetheless, numerous debt renegotiations loom on the horizon.

China’s efforts to address emerging debt crises along the Belt and Road have been insufficient.

Before the pandemic, China had begun to respond to criticism of its lending practices by

signing on to the Group of Twenty (G20) Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing;
partnering with the IMF to set up a training center in Beijing to help countries improve their ability to assess debt sustainability;
inking a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with eight MDBs, establishing a Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance;
endorsing the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment; and
publishing a debt sustainability framework for BRI that it asserted was similar to the standards used by the IMF and World Bank.86

To date, China has not taken enough action on these pledges. China’s policies are critical to any global debt relief efforts, as it is by far the largest sovereign creditor to the world’s seventy-three poorest countries.87 In response to the pandemic, China has notionally signed on to IMF, World Bank, and G20 debt suspension initiatives.88 Beijing, however, initially insisted that its policy banks, which issue the bulk of BRI loans, are exempt from the Debt Service Suspension Initiative and similar debt relief pledges.89 Only after sustained international pressure did China relent and agree to enter into renegotiations to restructure China EXIM loans, which account for approximately 30 percent of total BRI loans.90 Still, indications are that China continues to insist that CDB loans are ineligible for the Debt Service Suspension Initiative.91 China’s stance underscores its understanding of these projects as commercial ventures rather than pure development activities and risks forcing BRI participants to choose between meeting debt-service requirements to China or funding local economic recovery and critical medical services at a moment of historic crisis.

China is likely to resist canceling many debts related to BRI projects even in the face of this global crisis and will instead push to extend the grace period of loans, increase the maturity of the loans, reschedule payments, and extend lines of credit (see figure 4).92 For example, China agreed to give Kyrgyzstan a deferral on $35 million in debt repayments due in 2020but added a 2 percent interest rate to the amount.93 China rarely cancels debt, the exception being the relatively small percentage of its lending that is foreign aid given on an interest-free basis. China is likely to push for private bilateral negotiations with each of the BRI countries and make decisions on a case-by-case basis.

China will continue to use ad hoc BRI arrangements to gain access to BRI country markets.

Xi Jinping has emphasized BRI’s goal of “advanc[ing] the building of free trade areas and promot[ing] liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment.”94 China’s thirteenth Five Year Plan committed to a swift process of fulfilling Xi’s wish, stating, “We will speed up efforts to implement the free trade area strategy, gradually establishing a network of high-standard free trade areas. We will actively engage in negotiations with countries and regions along the routes of the Belt and Road Initiative on the building of free trade areas.”95

Until the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was signed in November 15, 2020, however, little progress had been made in negotiating such free trade agreements. Started by the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), RCEP adds Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, resulting in an agreement connecting nearly 30 percent of the world’s people and output. All RCEP members except Australia and Japanare also BRI countries, thereby creating baseline rules governing trade, investment, intellectual property protection, government procurement, and competition policy for this subset of BRI countries.

Many of the rules in RCEP do not extend much past the basic World Trade Organization (WTO) trading rules. The agreement’s provisions on e-commerce, digital trade, competition, and government procurement, however, as well as the important rules of origin that permit inputs from any RCEP country to be counted together when determining whether a good qualifies for RCEP preferences, are significant.96 Because many of the tariffs on goods traded among RCEP members are already low or will not change as a result of the agreement, RCEP could have limited immediate economic effect.97 RCEP can, however, be expected to incentivize supply chains to operate within the region and to enhance the gains from BRI’s strengthened transport, energy, and telecommunications links among RCEP members.98 RCEP also signals a greater willingness among these Asian countries to work together without the United States. The agreement is likely to promote further integration of these economies and solidify China’s position as the center of Asian trade and investment.

RCEP notwithstanding, China has few trade or investment agreements with its other BRI partners. Outside of RCEP, the lack of deep, transparent agreements establishing reciprocal market access between China and its BRI partners has given China more flexibility, as its ad hoc BRI arrangements are more opaque and contain fewer basic requirements. One-off bilateral deals also give little indication about whether any increased access to BRI markets, including to the Chinese market, will be available to others or limited to preferential access for firms pursuing a BRI project. Moreover, the ad hoc, secretive nature of most BRI contracts makes it difficult for countries to take collective action in responding to China should they believe the terms of the contracts are unfair.

What is clear is that China’s trade with BRI countries has been growing more rapidly than its trade with non-BRI countries. In 2019, China’s total trade with BRI partners was $1.34 trillion, 7.4 percent higher than its aggregate growth in trade.99 China’s exports to BRI countries also far exceeded its imports, in part because BRI countries have imported a significant amount of construction equipment and building materials from China. For the United States, the absence of transparent agreements establishing basic market access, contract, and procurement rules leaves U.S. companies uncertain of what their rights could be should they wish to participate in BRI projects.

Despite the global economic slowdown, BRI countries will continue to seek Chinese loansand Beijing will continue to fund BRI projects.

China’s own debt burden and its need to devote resources to boosting economic growth at home haveraised questions about its ability to continue funding BRI, particularly if forced to choose between investing more in its own economy or in BRI countries.100 BRI lending, however, remains a small portion of Chinese banks’ overall investment portfolios. Chinese policy banks enjoy strong political support and have ample room to continue to lend to BRI countries. At the peak of BRI, China was estimated to have lent $50 to 60 billion annually, a fraction of the $2.6 trillion in annual Chinese bank lending.101 BRI’s two main funders, CDB and China EXIM, had committed only 2.9 percent and 3.1 percent of their assets, respectively, to BRI as of the end of 2018.102 In addition, given that other multinational lenders outside of China are retrenching at a moment of upheaval, China can lend at a smaller scale than it did prior to the pandemic and still make a significant impact on recipient states and potentially generate political goodwill as well.

BRI will endure as countries continue to request that Beijing fund additional projects, despite the global economic cataclysm and their rising debt burdens, and as China maintains the capacity to lend. For example, despite the fact that the signature China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—an initiative that is explored in more detail below—was already behind schedule and over budget, in July 2020 the two countries announced $11 billion of new rail and hydropower projects in the corridor.103 That same month, China also announced a twenty-five-year, $400 billion slate of investments in Iran, for which it will receive a regular and heavily discounted supply of Iranian oil in exchange.104

Although China will continue to build traditional infrastructure in BRI countries, it will likely shift its emphasis toward less costly yet influential projects through the Digital (DSR) and Health Silk Roads (HSR):105

After the COVID-19 outbreak, senior Chinese government officials have emphasized that digital projects could help BRI countries’ economic recovery.106 In December 2020, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi signaled Beijing would make this shift, declaring the “Digital Silk Road is a priority area for BRI cooperation in the next stage.”107
Moreover, the pandemic itself is likely to generate demand for DSR projects in BRI countriesas economic activity continues to move online.108
Finally, faced with the increasing prospect that they could be excluded from the U.S. market and those of U.S. allies in Europe and Asia, Chinese telecommunications and internet companies want to boost their market share in other regions and could redouble their DSR efforts in Africa, Central Asia, and South and Southeast Asia.109

CDB: China Development Bank IFI: international financial institution MDB: Multilateral development bank SOE: state-owned enterprise 5G: fifth-generation fintech: financial services technology MDB: Multilateral development bank

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“<a href="http://silkroadbriefing.com/news/2020/02/28/kyrgyzstan-cancels-china-logistics-super-hub-investment-al-bashy-protests">Kyrgyzstan Cancels China Logistics Super-Hub Investment After At-Bashy Protests</a>,” Silk Road Briefing, February 28, 2020, “<a href="http://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Thai-Belt-and-Road-project-bumps-into-finance-and-liability-issues">Thai Belt and Road Project Bumps Into Finance and Liability Issues</a>,” Nikkei Asian Review, September 12, 2019; and “<a href="http://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Cautious-EU-holds-China-s-Europe-ambitions-in-check">Cautious EU Holds China’s Europe Ambitions in Check</a>,” Nikkei Asian Review, July 28, 2019.
“<a href="http://reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-silkroad/china-says-one-fifth-of-belt-and-road-projects-seriously-affected-by-pandemic-idUSKBN…">China Says One-Fifth of Belt and Road Projects ‘Seriously Affected’ by Pandemic</a>,” Reuters, June 18, 2020.
Dzulfiqar Fathur Rahman, “<a href="http://thejakartapost.com/news/2020/04/15/jakarta-bandung-high-speed-railway-project-delayed-amid-pandemic.html">Jakarata-Bandung High-Speed Railway Project Delayed Amid Pandemic</a>,” Jakarta Post, April 15, 2020.
Gabriel Wildau and Nan Ma, “<a href="http://ft.com/content/18db2e80-3571-11e7-bce4-9023f8c0fd2e">In Charts: China’s Belt and Road Initiative</a>,” Financial Times, May 10, 2017, “<a href="http://brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/aid-procurement-africa-zhang-gutman.pdf">Aid Procurement and the Development of Local Industry: A Question for Africa</a>,” Brookings Institution Global Economy and Development Working Paper 88, June 2015.
Nikki Sun, “<a href="http://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/China-Development-Bank-commits-250bn-to-Belt-and-Road">China Development Bank Commits $250bn to Belt and Road</a>,” Nikkei Asian Review, January 15, 2018.
Hale, Liu, and Urpelainen, <a href="http://sais-isep.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/ISEP-BSG-BRI-Report-.pdf">Belt and Road Decision-Making in China and Recipient Countries</a>.
For example, between 2000 and 2014, U.S. official finance was $394.6 billion, of which $366.4 billion (or 93 percent) was official development assistance given on concessional terms. Over that same period, China’s official finance was $354.3 billion, of which only $81.1 billion (or 23 percent) was official development assistance. AidData, “<a href="http://aiddata.org/china-official-finance">China’s Global Development Footprint</a>,” AidData, accessed December 29, 2020; and Scott Morris, Brad Parks, and Alysha Gardner, <a href="http://cgdev.org/publication/chinese-and-world-bank-lending-terms-systematic-comparison">Chinese and World Bank Lending Terms: A Systematic Comparison Across 157 Countries and 15 Years</a>, CGD Policy Paper 170 (Center for Global Development: April 2, 2020).
Veasna Kong, Steven G. Cochrane, Brendan Meighan, and Matthew Walsh, <a href="http://moodysanalytics.com/-/media/article/2019/belt-and-road-initiative.pdf">The Belt and Road Initiative Six Years On</a> (Moody’s Analytics, June 2019).
Bushra Bataineh, Michael Bennon, Francis f*ckuyama, “<a href="http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/publication/how-belt-and-road-gained-steam-causes-and-implications-china%E2%80%99s-rise-global">How the Belt and Road Gained Steam: The Causes and Implications of China’s Rise in Global Infrastructure</a>,” Stanford Center on Development, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, May 2019.
Russel and Berger, <a href=" http://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/Navigating%20the%20Belt%20and%20Road%20Initiative_2.pdf">Navigating the Belt and Road Initiative</a>.
Roland Rajah, Alexandre Dayant, and Jonathan Pryke, <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/ocean-debt-belt-and-road-and-debt-diplomacy-pacific">Ocean of Debt? Belt and Road and Debt Diplomacy in the Pacific</a> (Lowy Institute, October 21, 2019); Deborah Brautigam, “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23792949.2019.1689828">A Critical Look at Chinese ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’: The Rise of a Meme</a>,” Area Development and Policy 5 (2020); and Agatha Kratz, Matthew Mingey, and Drew D’Alelio, <a href="https://rhg.com/%20wp-content/uploads/2020/10/RHG_SeekingRelief_8Oct2020_Final.pdf">Seeking Relief: China’s Overseas Debt After COVID-19</a> (Rhodium Group, October 8, 2020).
Meg Rithmire and Yihao Li, “<a href="https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=55410">Chinese Infrastructure Investment in Sri Lanka: A Peal or a Teardrop on the Belt and Road?</a>,” Harvard Business School Case 718–046, January 2019; Jones and Hameiri, and Debunking the Myth of ‘Debt-trap Diplomacy'.
Agatha Kratz, Allen Feng, and Logan Wright, “<a href="https://rhg.com/research/new-data-on-the-debt-trap-question/">New Data on the Debt Trap Question</a>,” Rhodium Group, April 26, 2019.
Jones and Hameiri, Debunking the Myth of ‘Debt-trap Diplomacy’.
<a href="http:// imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/09/30/world-economic-outlookoctober-2020">World Economic Outlook Update</a> (International Monetary Fund, October 2020).
Antoinette Sayeh and Ralph Chami, “<a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2020/06/COVID19-pandemic-impact-on-remittance-flows-sayeh.htm">Lifelines in Danger</a>,” Finance & Development 57, no. 2 (June 2020).
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Marc Jones, “<a href="http://reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirusratings-downgrades/coronavirus-pushes-global-credit-rating-downgrade-threatto-record-high-idUSKBN2331…">Coronavirus Pushes Global Credit Rating Downgrade Threat to Record High</a>,” Reuters, May 27, 2020.
Bank for International Settlements, “<a href="http://bis.org/statistics/totcredit.htm?m=6%7C380%7C669">Credit to the Non-Financial Sector</a>,” updated December 7, 2020.
Kristalina Georgieva, “<a href="https://blogs.imf.org/2020/03/16/policy-action-for-a-healthy-global-economy/">Policy action for a Healthy Global Economy</a>,” IMFBlog (blog), March 16, 2020.
“<a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/COVID-Lending-Tracker">COVID-19 Financial Assistance and Debt Service Relief</a>,” International Monetary Fund, updated December 21, 2020; and “<a href="https://www.imf.org/en/About/FAQ/imf-response-to-covid-19">The IMF’s Response to COVID-19</a>,” International Monetary Fund, updated October 28, 2020.
Stephanie Segal, “<a href=" http://csis.org/analysis/ tracking-international-financial-institutions-covid-19-response">Tracking International Financial Institutions’ COVID-19 Response</a>,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 21, 2020.
"<a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/ chinas-trade-with-bri-countries-surges-to-1-34-trillion-in-2019/articleshow/ 73271222.cms">China’s Trade With BRI Countries Surges to $1.3 Trillion in 2019</a>,” Economic Times, January 15, 2020.
Sébastien Thibault, “<a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2020/06/04/the-pandemic-is-hurting-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative">The Pandemic Is Hurting China’s Belt and Road Initiative</a>,” Economist, June 4, 2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zygy_663314/gyhd_663338/t1787197.shtml">Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu Briefs on China’s Participation in International Cooperation in COVID-19 Response</a>,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, June 8, 2020; and James Kynge and Sun Yu, “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5a3192be-27c6-4fe7-87e7-78d4158bd39b">China Faces Wave of Calls for Debt Relief on ‘Belt and Road’ Projects</a>,” Financial Times, April 30, 2020.
Aida Dzhumashova, “<a href="http://24.kg/english/151447_Exim_Bank_of_China_ to_reschedule_debt_of_Kyrgyzstan_">Exim Bank of China to Reschedule Debt of Kyrgyzstan</a>,” 24.kg News Agency, April 29, 2020.
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G20, “<a href="http:// bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Standardartikel/Topics/world/G7-G20/ G20-Documents/g20-operational-guidelines-for-sustainable-financing.pdf?__ blob=publicationFile&v=1">Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing</a>,” March 2017; “<a href="http://imf.org/en/Capacity-Development/Training/ ICDTC/Schedule/CT">IMF Institute Training at China-IMF Capacity Development Center (CICDC), Beijing, China</a>,” International Monetary Fund, accessed December 29, 2020; “<a href="http://imfcicdc.org/content/cicdc/en.html">Welcome to CICDC</a>,” China-IMF Capacity Development Center, accessed December 29, 2020; Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China and Asian Development Bank et al., “<a href="http:// aiib.org/en/about-aiib/who-we-are/partnership/_download/collaboration-on-matters. pdf">Memorandum of Understanding on Collaboration on Matters to Establish the Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance</a>,” March 25, 2019; G20, “<a href="http://mof. go.jp/english/international_policy/convention/g20/annex6_1.pdf">Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment</a>,” June 2019; and Frank Tang, “<a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3007714/china-seeks-allay-belt-and-road-debt-trap-concerns-standard">China Seeks to Allay Belt and Road ‘Debt Trap’ Concerns With Standard for Assessing Financial Risk</a>,” South China Morning Post, April 25, 2019.
Anuj Chopra, “<a href="http://barrons.com/news/ g20-declares-framework-on-debt-relief-for-poor-nations-01605277203?tesla=y">G20 Declares Framework to Deepen Debt Relief for Poor Nations</a>,” Agence France-Presse, November 13, 2020.
World Bank Group and IMF, “<a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/03/25/pr20103-joint-statement-world-bank-group-and-imf-call-to-action-on-debt-of-ida-countries">Joint Statement World Bank Group and IMF Call to Action on Debt of IDA Countries</a>,” International Monetary Fund Press Release No. 20/103, March 25, 2020.
G20, “<a href="http://g20.utoronto.ca/2020/2020-g20-finance-0415. html">Communiqué: Virtual Meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors</a>,” April 15, 2020; G20, “<a href="http://g20.org/en/media/Documents/Final%20 G20%20FMCBG%20Communiqu%C3%A9%20-%20July%202020.pdf">Communiqué: Virtual Meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors</a>,” July 18, 2020; Andrea Shalal, “<a href="http://reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-g7/ g7-ministers-urge-full-implementation-of-g20-debt-freeze-u-s-treasuryidUSKCN24E1SX">G7 ministers urge full implementation of G20 debt freeze: U.S. Treasury</a>,” Reuters, July 13, 2020; Jeremy Mark, “<a href="http://atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ new-atlanticist/where-does-china-really-stand-on-debt-relief">Where Does China Really Stand on Debt Relief?</a>” New Atlanticist (blog), Atlantic Council, June 8, 2020; Abi-Habib and Bradsher, “Poor Countries Borrowed Billions From China.”; Steil and Della Rocca, “Chinese Debt Could Cause Emerging Markets to Implode”; and Kynge and Yu, “China Faces Wave of Calls for Debt Relief on ‘Belt and Road’ Projects.”
Liangyu, “<a href="http://xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/21/c_137996270.htm">China’s Exim Bank’s B&R Loans Surpasses 1 Trln Yuan</a>,” XinhuaNet, April 21, 2019; Jason Lee, “<a href="http://reuters.com/article/us-china-finance-cdb-bri/chinadevelopment-bank-provides-over-190-billion-for-belt-and-road-projectsidUSKCN1R8095">China Development Bank Provides Over $190 Billion for Belt and Road Projects</a>,” Reuters, March 26, 2019; and Camilla Hodgson, “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6900c595-151b-4cfd-90bb-0be9967b7999">China Strikes Debt Deals With Poor Nations Under G20 Scheme</a>,” Financial Times, August 30, 2020.
Kevin Acker, “<a href="https://pandapawdragonclaw.blog/2020/08/31/what-we-know-about-chinas-approach-to-debt-relief-insights-from-two-decades-of-china-africa-debt-restructu…">What We Know About China’s Approach to Debt Relief: Insights From Two Decades of China-Africa Debt Restructuring</a>,” Panda Paw Dragon Claw (blog), August 31, 2020; and Bandiera and Tsiropoulos, “A Framework to Assess Debt Sustainability.”
Deborah Brautigam, “<a href="http://thediplomat.com/2020/04/chinese-debt-relief-fact-and-fiction">Chinese Debt Relief: Fact and Fiction</a>,” Diplomat, April 15, 2020; Joe Bavier, “<a href="http://reuters.com/article/us-congorepublic-imf/imf-approves-congo-republic-bailoutafter-china-debt-deal-idUSKCN1U62NR">IMF Approves Congo Republic Bailout After China Debt Deal</a>,” Reuters, July 11, 2019; and Kratz, Mingey, and D’Alelio, Seeking Relief.
Paul Bartlett, “<a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-offers-cash-strapped-Kyrgyzstan-a-glimmer-of-hope-on-debt">China Offers Cash-Strapped Kyrgyzstan a Glimmer of Hope on Debt</a>,” Nikkei Asian Review, December 3, 2020.
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, <a href="https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf">China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment and Finance Landscape </a>(OECD, 2018), 13.
"<a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/ chinas-trade-with-bri-countries-surges-to-1-34-trillion-in-2019/articleshow/ 73271222.cms">China’s Trade With BRI Countries Surges to $1.3 Trillion in 2019</a>,” Economic Times, January 15, 2020.
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Peter A. Petri and Michael Plummer, “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/16/rcep-a-new-trade-agreement-that-will-shape-global-economics-and-politics/">A New Trade Agreement That Will Shape Global Economics and Politics</a>,” Order From Chaos (blog), Brookings Institution, November 16, 2020.
"<a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/ chinas-trade-with-bri-countries-surges-to-1-34-trillion-in-2019/articleshow/ 73271222.cms">China’s Trade With BRI Countries Surges to $1.3 Trillion in 2019</a>,” Economic Times, January 15, 2020.
"<a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/ chinas-trade-with-bri-countries-surges-to-1-34-trillion-in-2019/articleshow/ 73271222.cms">China’s Trade With BRI Countries Surges to $1.3 Trillion in 2019</a>,” Economic Times, January 15, 2020.
David F. Gordon, Haoyu Tong, and Tabatha Anderson, <a href="https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2020/03/beyond-the-myths-of-the-bri">Beyond the Myths – Towards a Realistic Assessment of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: The Development-Finance Dimension</a> (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2020).
Kratz, Rosen, and Mingey, “Booster or Brake? COVID and the Belt and Road Initiative.”
Haibin Zhu, Karen Li, Katherine Lei, and Grace Ng, “A Stress Test for China’s Overseas Lending.”
Faseeh Mangi, “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2020-07-21/supply-chains-latest-pakistan-helps-revive-china-s-belt-and-road">China’s Belt and Road Awakens With a Push Through Pakistan</a>,” Bloomberg, July 21, 2020.
Adnan Aamir, “<a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/China-Iran-deal-overshadows-Pakistan-Belt-and-Road-project">China-Iran Deal Overshadows Pakistan Belt and Road Project</a>,” Nikkei Asian Review, July 21, 2020; Farnaz Fassihi and Steven Lee Myers, “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/11/world/asia/china-iran-trade-military-deal.html">Defying U.S., China and Iran Near Trade and Military Partnership</a>,” New York Times, July 11, 2020.
Jude Blanchette and Jonathan Hillman, “<a href="http://csis.org/analysis/chinas-digital-silk-road-after-coronavirus">China’s Digital Silk Road After the Coronavirus</a>,” Over the Horizon (blog), Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 13, 2020.
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“<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1841816.shtml">Wang Yi Attends the Meeting of the Advisory Council of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation</a>,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, December 19, 2020.
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George Parker, Nic Fildes, Helen Warrel, and Demetri Sevastopulo, “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/997da795-e088-467e-aa54-74f76c321a75">UK Orders Ban of New Huawei Equipment From End of Year</a>,” Financial Times, July 14, 2020; Li Tao, “<a href="https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-leaders-and-founders/article/2177194/japan-decides-exclude-huawei-zte-government">Japan Latest Country to Exclude Huawei, ZTE From 5G Roll-out Over Security Concerns</a>,” South China Morning Post, December 10, 2018; Momoko Kidera, “<a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Huawei-crackdown/Huawei-s-deep-roots-put-Africa-beyond-reach-of-US-crackdown">Huawei’s Deep Roots Put Africa Beyond Reach of US Crackdown</a>,” Nikkei Asian Review, August 15, 2020.