Overview
The expectation of privacy is a legal test, originated fromKatz v. United Statesand is a key component ofFourth Amendmentanalysis. TheFourth Amendmentprotects people from warrantlesssearches of placesorseizures of personsorobjects, in which they have a subjective expectation of privacy that is deemedreasonable. The test determines whether an action by the government has violated an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
InKatz, Justice Harlan created the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test in his concurring opinion. Although it was not formulated by the majority, this test has been the main takeaway of the case. Justice Harlan created a two-part test:
- The individual has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.
- The expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
If both requirements have been met, and the government has taken an action which violates this "expectation," then the government's action has violated the individual's Fourth Amendment rights.
Elaborating on & Applying the Test
According to the Supreme Court inRakas v. Illinois(1978), the "expectation of privacy must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society."
For example, private homes are at the core ofFourth Amendmentprotection, as they are closely associated with the ownership interest in property law.
Exceptions
There are, however, exceptions to the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test. For example, federalFourth Amendmentprotections do not extend to governmental intrusion and information collection conducted upon open fields; expectation of privacy in anopen fieldis not consideredreasonable. Some states, however, do grant protection toopen fields.
Illustrative Cases
See e.g., Gonzales v. Uber Techs., Inc., 305 F. Supp. 3d 1078 (2018); andUnited States v. Haqq, 213 F. Supp. 2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
[Last updated in December of 2022 by the Wex Definitions Team]
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The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test, born out of the landmark case Katz v. United States, stands as a cornerstone in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In this case, Justice Harlan's concurring opinion introduced a two-part test that has since become the focal point of discussions on privacy rights. My expertise allows me to emphasize that, despite not being the majority opinion, Justice Harlan's test has become the prevailing interpretation of the case.
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