China set to eclipse US air superiority in Pacific (2024)

China is on pace to surpass the United States in 5^th generation fighter production, a dynamic shift with significant implications for the balance of air power in the Pacific.

This month, Nikkei reported that China’s inventory of J-20A 5^th generation fighters could soon overtake the US inventory of 187 F-22 Raptors, with China already having 150 airframes designed to match the F-22 in air-to-air combat.

Although the report notes that while the US has 360 F-35As, it notes that China’s J-20A production is gaining speed and that if current delivery rates are sustained China is on track to exceed the number of US F-22 airframes within this year.

The F-22, the world’s first 5^th generation fighter, was designed in the 1990s and is still touted as the US’ most advanced air superiority jet. It is the first air superiority fighter designed around stealth to give it an advantage over previous fighters.

Entering service in 2005, the F-22 was meant to replace the 4^th generation F-15 Eagle in frontline service, combining stealth, integrated avionics, and super maneuverability.

Sandboxx notes in an article this month that the F-22 can carry two AIM-9X Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles and six AIM-120 AMRAAM radar-guided ones in an internal weapons bay alongside an M61A2 20-mm cannon with 480 rounds for dogfights.

For close air support, the report says that the F-22 can carry two 450-kilogram GBU-32 JDAM smart bombs or eight 113-kilogram Small Diameter Bombs.

Developments in China’s manufacturing techniques and jet engine technology have recently accelerated production of the rival J-20. In that direction, South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported in November 2022 that China is using world-class pulsating production lines to speed up its J-20 fighter deliveries.

SCMP notes that the new pulsating production techniques and improved domestic engines have pushed the number of J-20 airframes to equal or even exceed the numbers of the US F-22 Raptor, whose production was stopped in 2011 with only 187 airframes built.

In contrast, SCMP mentions that China may already have up to 200 J-20s based on serial numbers on the aircraft displayed during the 2022 Zhuhai Air Show.

China may also be close to solving key problems with its jet engine technology, which to date has been a significant handicap for its jet fighters. SCMP reported in March 2022 that the J-20 has been tested with afterburning WS-15J engines in a bid to improve its maneuverability and combat capability.

The same report notes that China’s WS-15J will eventually replace Russian AL-31F engines currently installed in its J-20 fleet, an indication of China’s increased confidence in its jet engine manufacturing methods and metallurgy.

Asia Times noted in October 2022 that China’s incremental approach to jet fighter development through reverse-engineering and 5^th generation fighter technology research.

The J-20’s upgrade potential makes the type a viable basis for China’s 6^th generation fighter program, which would conceivably facilitate faster development timelines than similar UK and US projects, including the US Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) project, which is slated to be fielded in the 2030s.

But despite fast-growing aircraft numbers, the J-20 may have qualitative flaws. In a September 2021 article for National Defense Magazine, Jon Harper notes that the J-20 is the largest low-observability fighter in production, which may imply it is a heavier, less-agile aircraft.

Harper also states that China may still need to solve challenges in true sensor fusion and seamless passive sensor integration. However, future J-20 variants are widely expected to continue to narrow the technology gap between the US and China.

US military leaders are publicly downplaying that threat, however. US Air Force head of Pacific Forces General Kenneth Wilsbach noted that China’s fighter programs were “not anything to lose sleep over.”

Similarly, US Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles Brown has pooh-poohed China’s J-20, noting that while China has impressive command and control over its J-20s in operations involving F-35s in the East China Sea, the type’s capabilities were nothing he would worry too much about.

However, the US decision to stop F-22 production may have significant consequences for US airpower in an era of renewed great power competition.

Defense channel Task and Purpose explains in a December 2022 episode the many factors that stopped F-22 production, which included the perceived irrelevance of the F-22 in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the view that China and Russia will not be able to field 5^th generation fighters until after the 2020s, and that the F-22 was a competitor to the newer and more versatile US-made F-35.

That decision, Task and Purpose notes, has subsequently overstretched the US Air Force, as its current force structure needs to generate more sorties for a possible fight against China including over Taiwan.

The report also notes that the US reconsidered restarting F-22 production in 2016, but its production lines had already been reallocated for F-35 production. It suggested it might be cheaper at this point to develop a new aircraft such as the NGA) 6^th generation fighter.

Task and Purpose also mentions that since the US never exported the F-22 due to security concerns about its stealth technology falling into the hands of US adversaries, US allies may not have the air capabilities needed to operate effectively alongside US forces to defend themselves against increasingly advanced enemy fighters.

At a higher strategic level, this may mean that China has already reached parity or even surpassed US airpower in the Pacific, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The US now fields only 48 of 60 “multirole” fighter squadrons, with the fighter shortage most felt in the Pacific where it fields just 11 out of 13 needed. Moreover, the US fighter fleet’s readiness is steadily declining, with the average age of its fighters now 28.8 years old and pilots getting just 9.7 flight hours per month, compared with 22.3 hours before the 1991 Gulf War.

To maintain minimal fighter strength levels, the US must produce 72 fighters a year and keep its allies at a comparable level of readiness, a calculation, of course, that risks mistaking quantity for capability.